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Abstract
Soda taxes aim to reduce excessive sugar consumption. Policymakers
highlight the young, particularly from poor backgrounds, and high sugar con-
sumers as groups whose behavior they would most like to influence. There
are also concerns about the policy being regressive. We assess who are most
impacted by soda taxes. We estimate demand using micro longitudinal data
covering on-the-go purchases, and exploit the panel dimension to estimate
individual specific preferences. We relate these preferences and counterfac-
tual predictions to individual characteristics and show that soda taxes are
relatively effective at targeting the sugar intake of the young, are less suc-
cessful at targeting the intake of those with high total dietary sugar, and are
unlikely to be strongly regressive especially if consumers benefit from averted
internalities.
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1 Introduction
Sugar consumption is far in excess of medically recommended levels in much of the
developed world. Excess sugar consumption is linked with a range of diet-related
diseases, including diabetes, cancers and heart disease, and is thought to be partic-
ularly detrimental to children (WHO (2015)). Soft drinks products are a leading
contributor to dietary sugar (see CDC (2016)). Taxes on these products (soda
taxes) have been proposed as a way to reduce sugar consumption for individuals
whose consumption generates costs that are borne by others (externalities) or for
whom any future costs of consumption are large and partially ignored at the point
of consumption (internalities). A growing number of jurisdictions have adopted
soda taxes.1 Soft drinks are a particularly large contributor to dietary sugar among
the young, those with high overall dietary sugar, and youth from low income house-
holds,2 and policymakers have identified these groups as the ones whose behavior
they would most like to change. The impact of soda taxes, and whether ultimately
they are successful in improving welfare, will depend crucially on how demand re-
sponses vary across individuals from these targeted groups.
Our contribution in this paper is to assess whether soda taxes are effective at
lowering the sugar consumption of individuals that policy has targeted (i.e. the
young, high sugar consumers and the poor). We focus on the important but under-
studied on-the-go segment of the market. We use novel data on UK individuals to
estimate a model of consumer choice, uncover individual specific preferences, and
simulate the impacts of a soda tax. We show that the tax does a good job at tar-
geting young consumers and those from low income households, but not individuals
from households with high total dietary sugar. The economic burden of the tax is
moderately higher for individuals from lower income households; however, we also
find that they reduce sugar consumption by more, so this leaves open the possibility
that these offset the economic burden. Relative to the existing literature we make
two main advances.
First, we study purchase decisions made by individuals for immediate consump-
tion on-the-go. Studying the on-the-go segment is important for a number of rea-
sons. Firstly, consumption on-the-go is common – close to half of sugar from soft
drinks is obtained outside the home. Yet there is little evidence on choice behavior
on-the-go, with the bulk of the literature focusing on purchases made in super-
1As of December 2019 43 countries and 8 US cities had soda taxes in clear (GFRP (2019)).
2See, for example, Han and Powell (2013), Cavadini et al. (2000), CDC (2016) and Public
Health England (2015), and Appendix A.1 where we provide evidence of this based on dietary
intake data from the UK and the US.
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markets and brought into the home for future consumption. Secondly, observing
individual on-the-go purchases provides an excellent opportunity for identification
of individual preferences; in contrast to information on household level at-home
purchases, purchases and consumption are closely aligned and individual preference
estimates can be obtained without the need to place strong restrictions on the intra-
household preference structure (see, for example, Adams et al. (2014)) Thirdly, the
on-the-go data contain information on teenagers and young adults, who are explicit
targets of the soda taxes, but who are typically not identified as a distinct group in
data based on household purchases.
Second, we model consumer preferences as individual level parameters that we
estimate, rather than modeling them using the standard random coefficient ap-
proach (where they are treated as random effects drawn from a known distribution).
This is important because it allows us to better assess how well targeted a tax is
and whether it is regressive. In particular, it means we avoid placing restrictions
on (or ruling out) correlation between consumer level preferences and attributes
(including purchase behavior for other goods). As a result we are able to directly
relate individual level preferences and predictions of the impact of the tax to con-
sumer attributes, and can therefore assess precisely which individuals respond to
the tax and on whom the economic burden of the tax falls most heavily.
We find that preferences vary with demographics in ways that would be difficult
to capture by specifying a priori a random coefficient distribution. For instance, our
estimates show a non-monotonic relationship between age and sugar preferences;
on average those aged 13-21 have stronger preferences than those aged 22-30, who
in turn have stronger sugar preferences than older individuals, but among older
individuals sugar preferences are increasing in age. In contrast sugar preferences
exhibit a monotonically increasing relationship with deciles of the distribution of
total dietary sugar. However, unlike the young, those with higher overall levels of
dietary sugar also tend to be relatively price insensitive.
Our results suggest that taxes of the form and size that have been implemented
in the UK and many US locations lead to reductions of around 21% on average in
the amount of sugar consumers get from soft drinks on-the-go. Consumers switch
to alternative sources of sugar (both drinks and snacks), but this effect is relatively
modest. The tax is relatively well targeted at lowering the sugar consumption of
young people (including those from low-income households). In particular, those
aged 13-21 have the most steeply sloped demands, reducing sugar in response to
the tax by around 40% more than those aged over 40. The tax is less effective
at targeting the on-the-go sugar intake of people with a consistently high level
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of dietary sugar in their overall diets. Despite the individuals being more likely
to purchase soft drinks and to obtain relatively large amounts of sugar from them,
their sugar intake from drinks responds less strongly than those with more moderate
levels of sugar in their diets. This is because they tend to have strong preferences
for sugar and to be less price responsive.
Compensating variation, a measure of the direct costs the tax places on the
consumer through higher prices, is relatively large for the young and those with
a high levels of dietary sugar. In order to understand the full welfare impact on
these individuals we would also need to know the size of any saving from averted
internalities achieved by the tax. We do not measure these internalities. However,
the larger reductions in sugar among younger consumers (compared with that for
high overall sugar consumers) makes it more likely that averted internalities will
outweigh the direct consumer welfare loss from higher prices for this group.
A common concern about excise style taxes is that they are regressive; the poor
typically spend a higher share of their income on the taxed good, and end up bearing
a disproportionate share of the burden of the tax. However, if the tax plays the role
of correcting an internality, then the distributional analysis needs to account for the
fact that low income consumers might also save more from averted internalities, and
this may overturn the regressivity of the traditional economic burden of taxation
(Gruber and Koszegi (2004)).3 We show that compensating variation associated
with a tax on sugary soft drinks is around 20% higher for those in the bottom
half of the distribution of total annual grocery expenditure4 (a proxy for income)
compared with those in the top half. However, some evidence suggests that low
income individuals might suffer more from internalities (e.g. Allcott et al. (2019a),
Haushofer and Fehr (2014) and Mani et al. (2013)), and the reduction in sugar is
also larger for these individuals, leaving open the possibility that they will benefit
more from averted internalities, and that therefore the full effect on their welfare is
less negative than the compensating variation suggests.
Our work contributes to a burgeoning literature that aims at understanding the
effects of soda taxes. This include a set of papers that estimate the impact of the
implementation of specific soda taxes on prices and purchases (e.g. Bollinger and
Sexton (2018), Rojas and Wang (2017) and Seiler et al. (2018)), and a set of papers
that simulate the effects of soda taxes using estimates of behavior in the market
3Allcott et al. (2019a) consider the optimal tax rate for a government with preferences for
redistribution. If internalities are concentrated among the poor, all else equal, this raises the
optimal rate. On the other hand, if, all else equal, rich people have relatively weak preferences for
soft drinks this lowers the optimal rate as soft drinks consumption becomes a tag for (in)ability.
4Grocery expenditure includes expenditure on food, drink (including alcohol), pet food, toi-
letries and cleaning products.
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based on a period and location in which no soda tax is in place (e.g. Harding
and Lovenheim (2017), Bonnet and Réquillart (2013), Wang (2015), Allcott et al.
(2019a) and Chernozhukov et al. (2019)). Our work is more closely related to
this second literature. We add to this literature by using panel data to better
model individual level heterogeneity in preferences. This enables us to focus on
the distribution and targeting of effects that a soda tax will have, rather than
considering the average effects. We are also the first to provide evidence on responses
in the on-the-go segment of the market.
In focusing on choice behavior on-the-go we face a couple of challenges. First,
while a strength of our data is that it is novel, it means there are not many alterna-
tive data source to compare it with. We show that broad patterns of consumption
by age in our data are consistent with other data sources. We also discuss how
potential measurement error in price may impact analysis. Second, there may be
dependence of on-the-go demand on at-home purchases. Following Browning and
Meghir (1991) we test for this dependence, and we also allow for it in our on-the-go
demand model. We find that, once we account for individual level preference het-
erogeneity, evidence of demand linkages between on-the-go and at-home soft drinks
consumption is weak.
We consider three main potential issues regarding the robustness of our demand
estimates. First, our approach entails estimating fixed effects in a non-linear model
and therefore may suffer from an incidental parameters problem (Hahn and Newey
(2004), Arellano and Hahn (2007)). We show that any resulting bias is minimal
using the split sample jackknife bias correction procedure suggested in Dhaene and
Jochmans (2015).
Second, while a novelty of this paper is to be the first to study individual level
on-the-go behavior, it is important to consider whether our main conclusion about
the targeting of the tax could be unwound by demand patterns in the at-home
segment of the market. We estimate at-home demand using household level data
and show that household level responses at-home do not undo the relatively good
targeting at the young.
Third, in our main results we assume that the tax is 100% passed-through to
prices. Using recent data on prices of the two major soft drinks brands after the
implementation of a new soda tax in the UK in 2018, we show that pass-through
was very close to 100%. As a robustness check we show that this is similar to
what is predicted using our demand model together with a supply side model of
Bertrand-Nash price competition between manufacturers. Our equilibrium pass-
through estimates suggest that an excise style tax on sugary soft drinks is slightly
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over shifted on to consumer prices. Firms’ pricing response therefore acts to mod-
erately amplify the price differential that the tax creates between sugary and diet
varieties. We show that the patterns of demand response across individuals is very
similar under 100% and simulated equilibrium tax pass-through.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
data and describe the non-alcoholic drinks market. In Section 3 we describe our
model of consumer demand and summarize estimates of the demand model. In
Section 4 we present results of the soda tax simulation, consider how well targeted
the tax is, show the effects on consumer welfare and its distributional implications.
In Section 5 we consider possible concerns about the robustness of our results. A
final section concludes. In an Appendix we provide further details on the data and
demand estimates and present estimates of demand in the at-home segment and
details of our analysis of the supply side of the market and implied equilibrium
pass-through of the tax.
2 The non-alcoholic drinks market
We model behavior in the market for non-alcoholic drinks, considering consumers’
choice between alternative drinks and substitution towards snacks. Non-alcoholic
drinks include soft drinks (i.e. carbonated drinks – often referred to as soda – with
and without sugar, energy drinks, and other sugar-sweetened non-alcoholic drinks),
alternative sugary drinks (non-alcoholic drinks such as pure fruit juice and milk
based drinks such as shakes), and bottled water. “Soda taxes” are typically imposed
on soft drinks that contain sugar (and sometimes also on diet varieties). Pure fruit
juices that do not contain added sugar and drinks that are predominantly composed
of milk are typically exempt.
We focus on behavior when purchasing on-the-go. This is for two reasons. First,
it is an important part of the market and an important source of sugar, particularly
in children (Han and Powell (2013)), yet little attention has been paid to modeling
choice behavior on-the-go, largely due to the lack of high quality data. The existing
literature on soda taxes studies their impact on purchases made in grocery stores
for future consumption at home; but close to half of sugar obtained from sugar
sweetened soft drinks products is purchased for immediate consumption on-the-
go.5 Second, studying on-the-go behavior provides the opportunity to model and
exploit data on individual level purchases, including those made by teenagers and
5CDC (2016) and National Diet and Nutrition Survey Public Health England (2018); see
Appendix A.1 for further details.
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young adults. This provides an important opportunity to study the preferences of
individuals, rather than the aggregate preferences of the household.
A limitation of our data is that it does not include purchases in restaurants or
bars; this accounts for around one-quarter of on-the-go purchases.6 The other three-
quarters of the on-the-go purchases are made from vending machines, convenience
stores, kiosks and larger grocery stores when consumed immediately, which are
included in our data.
We also have data on purchases made in the at-home segment by the house-
holds to which the individuals in our on-the-go data belong. We use these data in
three ways. First, they allow us to obtain a measure of the sugar intensity of the
individuals’ entire diet (based on total at-home calories purchases of the household
she belongs to). We show how preferences and outcomes vary along this dimension.
Second, we consider possible demand linkages between the segments – for instance,
at-home household purchases might influence on-the-go purchases. We describe
the within individual correlation between on-the-go and at-home purchases. We
include a measure of the inventory of at-home drinks based on household purchases
in our model of demand for on-the-go purchases and find that it has little impact
on choices once we control for individual heterogeneity. We also use our model
of behavior in the at-home segment to assess whether our conclusions regarding
the individual targeting of soda taxes on they young could plausibly be undone by
off-setting behavior of the household in the at-home segment and show that this is
unlikely to be the case. Third, we use the at-home data in a robustness check where
we model supply-side responses to the introduction of a tax using information on
both segments.
2.1 Purchases
We use data from the Kantar Worldpanel and the associated food on-the-go survey.
These data are collected by the market research firm Kantar. The Worldpanel data
cover the at-home segment of the market. It tracks the grocery purchases made
and brought into the home by a sample of households that are representative of the
British population.The food on-the-go survey tracks food and drink purchases made
by individuals on-the-go for immediate consumption. Individuals in the on-the-go
survey are randomly drawn from households in the Worldpanel.
Households in the Worldpanel data scan the barcode of all grocery purchases
made and brought into the home. These include all food, drink (including alcohol),
6Calculations is based on National Diet and Nutrition Survey Public Health England (2018).
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pet food, toiletries and cleaning products; this gives us comprehensive information
on the total grocery baskets of the households to which the individuals in our
on-the-go sample belong.7 Our main interest is behavior recorded in the on-the-go
survey. To our knowledge the Kantar food on-the-go survey is unique. Participating
individuals record all purchases of snacks and non-alcoholic drinks for consumption
outside the home (with the exception of those made in bars and restaurants) using
mobile phones. In both the Worldpanel and food on-the-go survey we know what
products (at the barcode, or UPC, level) were purchased and the transaction price.
We also observe information on the store of purchase, household and individual
attributes and product attributes.
We use information on the on-the-go behavior of 5,555 individuals8. To estimate
demand we use information only on the individuals that report purchasing soft
drinks.9 Our estimation sample contains 2,449 individuals.10 The individuals who
do not purchase soft drinks at current prices are unlikely to be induced to purchase
soft drinks by the introduction of the tax.
We have data over the period June 2009-December 2014. We define a choice
occasion as a day in which an individual makes an on-the-go purchase of either
a non-alcoholic drink or a snack (defined as confectionery, nuts, potato chips and
fruit). We exploit the panel structure of the data to estimate consumer specific
preferences. In the estimation sample we observe individuals, on average, on 252
choice occasions. In total our sample consists of 616,544 choice occasions. In Table
2.1 we provide details on the distribution of observations per consumer. Over 95%
of consumers are observed for more than 25 choice occasions, and for over 60% of
consumers we observe 100 or more choice occasions.
These consumers purchase a drink product on 59% of choice occasions. When
purchasing drinks individuals choose a single product 83% of the time. On the
remaining choice occasions the consumer chooses multiple (typically two) products.
In this case we randomly select one purchase and use this in demand estimation.11
7The Kantar Worldpanel (and similar data collected in the US by AC Nielsen) have been used
in a number of papers studying consumer grocery demand (see, for instance, Aguiar and Hurst
(2007), Dubois et al. (2014) and Kaplan and Menzio (2015)).
8See Appendix C.1 for further details on the at-home data
9Strictly speaking, we use individuals that purchase at least 15 non-alcoholic drinks and at
least 10 soft drinks over the 5 and half years period. These individuals account for around 95%
of sugar from non-alcoholic drink purchases on-the-go.
10To provide a reality check we compare this to the Living Cost and Food Survey for the years
2009-2014 and find a similar figure.
11If instead we treat multiple purchases as separate choice occasion it leads essentially no
difference in parameter estimates.
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Table 2.1: Time series dimension of estimation sample










Notes: The table shows the number of choice occasions on which we observe individuals making purchase choices
based on the 2,449 individuals in the estimation sample. A choice occasion is a day in which the individual
purchases a snack.
2.2 Brands, products, prices and stores
In Table 2.2 we describe the products available in the on-the-go non-alcoholic drinks
market in the UK, their market shares and mean prices. Products we classify as
“soft drinks” are available in brands owned by Coca Cola Enterprises, Pepsico,
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Barrs. There are a large number of small brands
(each with a market share below 2%). We aggregate these small brands into a
composite “Other” brand; in aggregate this accounts for around 16% of the market.
We do not drop these niche brands as we are ultimately interested in the total
sugar consumers get on-the-go. The implicit assumption of this aggregation is that
product differentiation among these niche brands is not important to consumers.
We additionally include fruit juice, flavored milk and fruit (or flavored) water, which
together account for just under 10% of the market, and bottled water which account
for another 11%. Many brands are available in two different sizes. See further details
in Appendix A.2 on how we define products.
For each transaction we observe the type of store in which the purchase occurred
and the transaction level price. From these transaction level prices, and for each
product, we compute the average monthly price in each type of store. We use this
average monthly price in demand estimation. National chains in the UK set national
prices (see Competition Commission (2000)), we therefore use national prices for








Coca Cola 330 4.02 0.65
Coca Cola Diet 330 5.06 0.65
Coca Cola 500 7.65 1.15
Coca Cola Diet 500 10.16 1.15
Dr Pepper 3.29
Dr Pepper 330 0.46 0.63
Dr Pepper Diet 500 0.18 1.11
Dr Pepper 500 2.64 1.11
Fanta 3.83
Fanta 330 0.62 0.60
Fanta Diet 500 0.29 1.11
Fanta 500 2.92 1.11
Cherry Coke 2.91
Cherry Coke 330 0.49 0.62
Cherry Coke 500 1.57 1.11
Cherry Coke Diet 500 0.85 1.11
Oasis 3.69
Oasis 500 3.48 1.12
Oasis Diet 500 0.21 1.12
Sprite 1.96
Sprite 330 0.25 0.64
Sprite 500 1.71 1.12
Pepsico 10.32
Pepsi Diet 330 1.69 0.58
Pepsi 330 0.97 0.58
Pepsi Diet 500 5.62 1.00
Pepsi 500 2.03 1.00
GSK 7.22
Lucozade Energy 4.46
Lucozade Energy 380 2.40 0.95
Lucozade Energy 500 2.06 1.14
Ribena 2.76
Ribena 288 0.69 0.68
Ribena 500 1.58 1.11
Ribena Diet 500 0.50 1.11
Barrs 2.31
Irn Bru 330 0.71 0.58
Irn Bru Diet 330 0.36 0.58
Irn Bru 500 0.87 1.03
Irn Bru Diet 500 0.37 1.03
Composite soft drinks
Other 14.25 1.17
Other Diet 1.98 1.53
Alternative drinks
Fruit juice 7.51 1.10
Flavoured milk 1.64 1.01
Fruit water 0.85 0.90
Water 11.38 0.71
Notes: Market shares are based on transactions made by the 2,449 individuals in the estimation sample between
June 2009 and December 2014. Prices are the means across all choice occasions.
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Table 2.3: Retailer types
N %
Retailer types
National store Large 128,649 20.9
Small 88,570 14.4
Vending machines 48,435 7.9




Notes: The table shows the number and share of purchases made by 2,449 individuals in the estimation sample
in each retailer type between June 2009 and December 2014. Large national stores include Aldi, Asda, Lidl,
Morrisons, Sainsbury’s, Tesco and Waitrose. Small national chains include Budgens, Co-op, Costcutter, Greggs,
Holland and Barrett, Iceland, Londis, M&S, Netto, Spar and a few others.
In Appendix A.3 we provide more details of how we use transaction level prices
to construct the price series we utilize in estimation. Effectively, this entails com-
puting means across transaction prices. It is possible this procedure introduces
some measurement error; this is a standard problem faced in many discrete choice
settings in which the prices of the alternatives not chosen are not directly observed.
Schennach (2013) and Blundell et al. (2019) consider how to consistently estimate
continuous demand models with measurement error in prices, based on the mea-
surement error being of the form of “Berkson” errors (Berkson (1950)). We are
not aware of solutions to this problem in the case of discrete demand. We have
undertaken some simple Monte Carlo simulations that suggest that in our specific
case the impact of measurement error on our estimates are unlikely to be large (see
Appendix A.3 for more details). Extending results on consistent estimation with
“Berkson” errors to discrete choice demand settings is an interesting avenue for
future work.
Table 2.3 describes the number and share of purchases of non-alcoholic drinks
across retailer types. For convenience stores we distinguish between those in dif-
ferent regions of Great Britain. The largest share of purchases are made in stores
belonging to small national chains or convenience stores. The large national su-
permarket chains account together for around one-fifth of purchases, and vending
machines account for around 8%. In our demand model we allow for the product
availability to vary across the retailer types.12
12In particular, we consider a brand-size to be available in a retailer type if we observe at least
100 transactions for that product-retailer type across the 5 and half years covered by our data.
There is no evidence of temporal variation in product availability over this time.
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2.3 Demand linkages between on-the-go and at-home
We study the demand behavior of individuals while on-the go. However, it is
possible that an important margin of substitution is between at-home and on-the-go
consumption. In this section we present a simple test of separability of demand for
soft drinks at-home and on-the-go. At-home purchases are brought into the home
for future consumption, so we do not directly observe at-home consumption. We
therefore follow the literature on dynamic demand (e.g. Hendel and Nevo (2006a),
Hendel and Nevo (2006b)) by constructing a proxy measure of the inventory of
at-home soft drinks the household has access to.
Denote by Qoiτ the individual i’s date τ on-the-go soft drinks demand and Q
h
iτ
















where Πor(i)τ and, Π
h
r(i)t capture the prices of on-the-go and at-home soft drinks in the
region r where individual i resides and Ihf(i)τ denotes the inventory held by the indi-
vidual’s household f(i) at-home at time τ . The at-home demand function Dhi (., .)
embeds the sharing rule governing how household level demand translates into in-
dividual i at-home consumption. Under this demand structure, non-separability
between on-the-go and at-home choices arise through the (possible) dependence of
on-the-go demand on at-home demand.
Following Browning and Meghir (1991) and the subsequent literature, we test
weak separability in on-the-go demand with respect to at-home demand by testing
the exclusion of Qhiτ in D
o
i (., .) conditional on prices Π
o
r(i)τ . In our context we do
not directly observe individual demand at home; instead we observe household
purchases and can infer a household’s inventory using their purchase history.
Similarly to Hendel and Nevo (2006b), we measure this inventory as the cumula-
tive sum of past at-home purchases minus a household specific average consumption
level.13 This measure will be high after recent at-home purchases and will deplete
to zero following a sufficiently long period of no at-home purchases.


















13Specifically, we compute the household’s average consumption as the mean at-home volume
they purchase over their time in the sample – denote this by cf(i). We then compute the at-home
inventory as If(i)τ = max{0, If(i)τ−1 +Qhiτ − cf(i)}.
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/∂Ihf(i)τ 6= 0), testing for separability between demand on-the-
go and demand at-home is equivalent to using the reduced form demand to test
for separability between the on-the-go soft drink demand and at-home inventories,
conditional on prices.14
We thus consider the following regression model:
Qoiτ = λIhf(i)τ + βo ln Πor(i)τ + βh ln Πhr(i)τ + νi + εiτ
= λIhf(i)τ + γr(i)τ + νi + εiτ .
Testing for separability between at-home and on-the-go demands boils down to
testing the hypothesis that λ = 0. We measure consumer i’s on-the-go soft drinks
demand on date τ , Qoiτ , with an indicator variable equal to one if the consumer
chooses to purchase.15 Rather than construct prices indices, Πor(i)τ and Π
h
r(i)τ , we
include year-month-region effects, γr(i)τ , which control for the effect of prices. νi is
an individual fixed effect, and εiτ is an individual specific deviation.
For each individual in the full on-the-go sample we consider one observation for
every day (regardless of whether a drink is purchased or not) between the individ-
ual’s first and final day in the sample. We report coefficient estimates in Table 2.4.
In column (1) we report the correlation between on-the-go purchases and inventory
at-home. In column (2) we add in individual fixed effects, which results in the
coefficient on inventory dropping by an order of magnitude. On average, in our full
sample of 5,555 individuals, the probability someone purchases soft drinks on-the-go
on any day is around 4%. The average at-home inventory held is 1.0 litre, with a
standard deviation of 1.5. Therefore the inventory coefficient in column (2) means
a one standard deviation increase in at-home inventory leads to a 0.19 percentage
point increase in the probability of buying on-the-go (i.e. 1.5*0.00128*100). While
statistically significant (this regression is estimated using over 8 million observa-
tions), the magnitude of the effect is very small. Column (3) shows that controlling























15Similar results hold if we use quantity purchased.
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Table 2.4: Separability test between demand on-the-go and at-home
(1) (2) (3)
At-home inventory 0.00131 0.00128 0.00017
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Constant 0.03623 0.03627 0.03748
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008)
Time-region effects No No Yes
Individual effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.00011 0.00121 0.18854
Notes: Tables shows the conditional correlation between the on-the-go soft drinks purchases and at-home inventory
of soft drinks. We drop the top percentile of at-home inventory. There are 8,180,656 observations, one for every
day between the first and final day in the sample for each of the 5,555 individuals in the full on-the-go sample.
Our interpretation of this is that accounting for rich individual heterogeneity is
crucial in capturing demand patterns and, conditional on this, there is little evidence
that demand linkages between on-the-go and at-home soft drinks demand are of
first order importance. In our demand model we incorporate rich individual level
preference heterogeneity. Nonetheless, there remains the possibility that, while not
being key in driving overall on-the-go soft drinks demand, at-home purchases could
be important in driving exactly what products individuals choose. We therefore
allow for the possibility that at-home inventories of different types of drinks impact
consumer on-the-go product choice (see discussion on page 18 and estimates in Table
3.2). While it would be interesting to study more broadly the interactions between
household demand and individual on-the-go demand, we leave this for future work.
2.4 Demographics
Soda taxes are primarily justified on the grounds that they address externalities and
internalities. There is evidence that added sugar consumed in liquid form raises the
risk of developing a number of diseases.16 This gives rises to externalities through
increases in public health costs, and also potentially to internalities.
A number of recent papers have focused on the internality correcting rationale
of taxation; including in food and drink markets (O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006),
Haavio and Kotakorpi (2011), Allcott et al. (2019a)), cigarette markets (Gruber and
Koszegi (2004)), and energy markets (Allcott et al. (2014)). A large theory litera-
ture posits that not all individuals fully account for future costs of consumption (for
16See Allcott et al. (2019b) and Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (2015) for sum-
maries of the evidence.
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a survey see Rabin (1998)), often offering food and drink consumption as the mo-
tivating example. There also exists both experimental evidence that people have
behavioral biases with respect to food and drink consumption (see, for instance,
Read and Van Leeuwen (1998) and Gilbert et al. (2002)), and circumstantial ev-
idence from the existence of a multi-billion pound dieting industry (Cutler et al.
(2003)). We do not seek to measure the size of internalities. Rather, we focus on
how effective soda taxes are at reducing sugar consumption among those demo-
graphics (the young, high sugar consumers, and those with low incomes) that are
highlighted by policymakers as the groups whose consumption they would most like
to change.
Lowering the sugar intake of young people is a stated aim of public policy (for
instance, see CDC (2016), Public Health England (2015)). On average the young get
a relatively large fraction of their calories from sugar, so excess sugar consumption
is more severe among this group (see details in Appendix A.1). This tendency
has increased over time.17 Medical evidence suggests that exposure to sweetened
beverages early in life can establish strong lifelong preferences for these products
(Mennella et al. (2016)). The young are particularly susceptible to suffer from
internalities from excess sugar. The consequences of poor nutrition early in life
are profound: with excess sugar associated with poor mental health and school
performance in children, and poor childhood nutrition thought to be an important
determinant of later life health, social and economic outcomes and of persistent
inequality.18 It is likely that young people are less inclined to take account of the
long term consequences of poor dietary choices (for instance, Ameriks et al. (2007)
show that the young suffer more from self-control problems than older people).
Those with high sugar diets are a group that policymakers have also targeted (for
instance, see CDC (2016), Public Health England (2015)). Consuming more sugar
is associated with higher instances of diet related disease and associated medical ex-
penditures. If the marginal social costs from sugar consumption are increasing (e.g.
at lower levels of sugar consumption the probability of developing type II diabetes
is trivially small, but this probability rises non-linearly in sugar consumption) this
would reinforce the rationale for focusing on this group. Supporting this hypothesis
17For instance, Cavadini et al. (2000) document an increase in soft drink consumption in the
US for 11-18 years old of almost 300% for boys, and over 200% for girls between 1965 and 1996,
and Nielsen and Popkin (2004) document a contemporaneous fall in the share of calories children
get from milk.
18See, for instance Cawley (2010), Gortmaker et al. (2009) , Han and Powell (2013), Currie
(2009), Currie et al. (2010), Azäıs-Braesco et al. (2017), Baum and Ruhm (2009), and for more
description of consumption patterns see Ng et al. (2012), Rugg-Gunn et al. (2007)).
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Hall et al. (2011) show that adults with greater adiposity (more fat) experience
larger health gains from a given reduction in energy intake.
Our focus on how responses vary with a measure of income is motivated, in
part, by concerns that soda taxes are likely to be regressive. A second reason to
focus on low income individuals is that there is some evidence that they are more
likely to exhibit behavior that creates internalities than those on higher incomes
(see Haushofer and Fehr (2014) and Mani et al. (2013)). If all consumers suffer
from the same marginal internality, higher levels of soft drink consumption among
low income individuals would mean total internality costs are higher for this group.
Allcott et al. (2019a) provide evidence that marginal internalities may actually
be higher for low income consumers, implying any internalities may be even more
concentrated among this group.19
We construct a measure of total annual dietary sugar as the share of total house-
hold calories that are from added sugar using data on the entire household shopping
basket. We measure income using household total annual equivalized grocery ex-
penditure; we equivalize using the standard OECD modified equivalence scale.20
There are other demographics that might also be of interest, and in Appendix B we
show how the estimated preference parameters vary by gender and the household’s
socio-economic status (which is a good proxy for education level).
In Table 2.5 we describe the age distribution of the total on-the-go sample. We
estimate demand using the 2,449 individuals who are “soft drink purchasers”. The
table also summarizes other aspects of purchase behavior. Young consumers (rela-
tive to older ones): (i) are more likely to be soft drink purchasers, (ii) conditional
on being so, obtain more sugar from these products, and (iii) purchase soft drinks
more often and are more likely to buy sugar varieties – it is this rather than any
tendency to be more likely to buy the largest single portion size (500ml bottles)
that is key driving the higher sugar levels.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the same statistics for deciles of the distribution of total
annual dietary sugar and total annual equivalized grocery expenditure. Individuals
from households with more sugar in their total diet are both more likely to be
soft drink purchasers and, conditional on this, to get large quantities of sugar from
19Allcott et al. (2019a) use soft drinks consumption of people who state they have no self
control problems and of dieticians, conditional on demographic controls, as a measure of soft
drinks consumption of non-biased consumers and measure the degree of mis-optimization relative
to this benchmark.
20Grocery expenditure includes spending on food, drink (including alcohol), pet food, toiletries
and cleaning products. In Dubois et al. (2019) we show that equivalized grocery expenditure is
strongly correlated with current income; expenditure is often viewed as a better proxy for lifetime
income than current income (e.g. Poterba (1989)) so we use that as our main measure.
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these products. A similar pattern holds across the total annual equivalized grocery
expenditure distribution; individuals with lower total annual grocery expenditure
are more likely to be soft drink purchasers and obtain a relatively high amount of
sugar from these products.
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics by age groups
Age group
13-21 22-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60+
% of sample 11.1 13.8 20.3 21.5 17.2 16.1
Fraction of soft drink purchasers .44 .5 .53 .48 .38 .26
Conditional on purchase:
** Mean sugar from soft drinks per year (g) 2036 1784 1356 1378 1265 1057
** Mean number of purchases per year 46.3 43.2 38.7 34.1 33.4 28.8
** Fraction of sugary products 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.62
** Fraction of 500ml bottles 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.68
Notes: Row 1 shows the fraction of individual-year observations in each age group. Row 2 shows the fraction of
each age that are soft drink purchasers, defined as in footnote 9. The remaining rows show means for the set of
soft drink purchasers of; total annual sugar from these products, number of annual purchases, fraction of purchases
for sugary rather than diet varieties, and fraction of purchases for the larger 500ml bottle size.
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics by total annual dietary sugar
Decile of distribution of share of calories from added sugar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Upper bound of deciles 8.4 9.9 11 11.9 12.9 13.8 14.9 16.3 18.4 24.7
Fraction of soft drink purchasers .33 .41 .42 .41 .45 .45 .46 .49 .47 .48
Conditional on purchase:
** Mean sugar from soft drinks per year (g) 1035 1347 1277 1210 1296 1356 1541 1574 2020 1760
** Mean number of purchases per year 35.9 39 36.2 34.1 35.4 36.3 37.7 37.7 43.3 37.9
** Fraction of sugary products 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.66 .66 .66 .66 .7
** Fraction of 500ml bottles 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.73 .72 .71 .71 .73
Notes: Row 1 shows the upper bound of the decile of total annual dietary sugar. Row 2 shows the fraction of each
age that are soft drink purchasers, defined as in footnote 9. The remaining rows show means for the set of soft
drink purchasers of; total annual sugar from these products, number of annual purchases, fraction of purchases
for sugary rather than diet varieties, and fraction of purchases for the larger 500ml bottle size.
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics by total annual equivalized grocery expenditure
Decile of distribution of total equivalized grocery expenditure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Upper bound of decile .8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.5 3.1 5.1
Fraction of soft drink purchasers .48 .44 .44 .44 .48 .44 .4 .43 .44 .39
Conditional on purchase:
** Mean sugar from soft drinks per year (g) 1664 1454 1683 1426 1583 1514 1312 1291 1233 1440
** Mean number of purchases per year 41.5 36.4 42.8 35.9 37.6 37.4 34.3 35 34.2 39.1
** Fraction of sugary products 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.63 .66 .61 .63 .62
** Fraction of 500ml bottles 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.70 .72 .72 .72 .72
Notes: Row 1 gives the upper bound of the decile, measured in £1000, of total annual equivalized grocery expendi-
ture. Row 2 shows the fraction of each age that are soft drink purchasers, defined as in footnote 9. The remaining
rows show means for the set of soft drink purchasers of; total annual sugar from these products, number of annual
purchases, fraction of purchases for sugary rather than diet varieties, and fraction of purchases for the larger
500ml bottle size.
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3 Model and estimated coefficients
In this section we develop a model of consumer choice in the non-alcoholic drinks
market. What distinguishes our approach from previous work is: (i) we focus on
modeling the preferences of individuals using information on their purchases on-
the-go, and (ii) we exploit the long panel nature of our data to estimate individual
specific preference parameters, giving us the ability to relate individual specific
preferences and counterfactual effects to a wide range of demographics and measures
of individual behavior.21
3.1 Demand model
We index consumers by i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We observe each consumer on many choice
occasions, indexed by τ = {1, . . . , T }. A choice occasion τ refers to a consumer
visiting a retailer r(τ) at time t(τ) and purchasing either a non-alcoholic drink or
a snack.22 Denote the available set of drinks products in retailer r = {1, . . . , R}
during choice occasion τ as Ωr(τ).
We index the J non-alcoholic drinks products (i.e. the “inside goods”) by j
with j = {1, . . . , j′} for the soft drinks and j = {j′ + 1, . . . , J} for the alternative
drinks. These products are reported in Table 2.2. We allow for the possibility that
consumers instead choose either a sugary or a non-sugar snack. We refer to these
as “outside options”, and we indicate the sugary snack by j = 0̄ and the non-sugar
snack by j = 0. The choice set facing a consumer on choice occasion τ contains
the subset Ωr(τ) of the J drinks products available in retailer r plus the two outside
options. Typically several soft drinks products belong to a single brand – we denote
the brand that product j belongs to as b(j). Products within a brand differ based
on whether they are a sugary or diet variety and in their pack size.
We assume the payoff associated with selecting a product j on choice occasion
τ takes the form:







d(i)zj + ξd(i)b(j)t(τ) + ζd(i)b(j)r(τ) + εijτ , (3.1)
21We estimate a similar model of demand in the at-home segment; details are reported in
Appendix C.
22We treat the decision to visit a store as exogenous.
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and the payoffs from selecting the outside options are given by:
Ui0̄τ =βi + εi0̄τ
Ui0τ =εi0τ ,
where (εi0τ , εi0̄τ , εi1τ , .., εiJτ ) are distributed type I extreme value independently
across individuals, options and time.
pjr(τ)t(τ) denotes the price of product j, which varies through time (t) and across
retailer types (r). sj is a dummy variable indicating whether the product contains
sugar and wj is a dummy variable for whether the product is a drink (as opposed
to a snack). We include individual specific preferences over these three key product
characteristics. For the remaining characteristics we restrict heterogeneity to vary
across demographic groups, where we denote by d(i) the group to which individual
i belongs. These groups distinguish between individuals on the basis of gender and
age (below 40 and 40 and above).
A convenient feature of modeling purchases made on-the-go for immediate con-
sumption is that it minimizes concerns about dynamics in demand arising from
consumer stockpiling (a situation considered in Wang (2015)); by definition the con-
sumption occasions that we are considering do not involve storage. Another form
of dynamics in demand would arise if there are intertemporal non-separabilities in
preferences. An obvious form of non-separability is that recent at-home purchases
impact on-the-go demands. In Section 2.3 we provide evidence that, once fixed un-
observed individual heterogeneity is accounted for, this form of demand linkage is
not of first order importance for the decision to purchase a soft drink in our setting.
In our demand model we allow for the possibility that at-home inventories impact
the choice of what specific (if any) drink an individual chooses. We do this by
controlling for κijτ ; a measure of the inventory of drinks the individual has access
to due to recent at-home purchases – this is defined analogously to the inventory
measure we use on page 11. We include a j index on this variable to indicate that
it varies across products. In practice we compute separate at-home inventory vari-
ables for sugary soft drinks, diet soft drinks, fruit juices, flavored milk and waters
and let each measure impact the on-the-go utility of products belonging to that set.
We also include a measure of weekly regional brand level advertising expendi-
ture, ab(j)t(τ) (variation by region arises due to the geographic span of regional TV
channels),23 and the effects of temperature (hc(i)t(τ)) in location c(i) where the con-
23We measure weekly advertising expenditure in the AC Nielsen Advertising Digest. We com-
pute product specific stocks based on a monthly depreciation rate of 0.9. This is similar to the
rate used in Dubois et al. (2018) using similar data in the potato chips market.
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sumer lives at time t(τ).24 We include size-carton type effects (zj), time-varying
brand effects (ξd(i)b(j)t(τ)) (at the year and quarter level) and retailer-brand effects
(ζd(i)b(j)r(τ)).
Denote by α = (α1, . . . , αN)
′, β = (β1, . . . , βN)
′ and γ = (γ1, . . . , γN)
′ the
vectors of individual preference parameters. These enable the model to capture
within individual correlation in choices across choice occasions. We do not place
any a priori restriction on the joint distribution of these variables. We use the
large T dimension of our data to recover estimates of individual specific parameters
(α,β,γ), while the large N dimension allows us to identify nonparametrically the
joint probability distribution function f(αi, βi, γi) using the empirical probability
distribution function of estimated (α,β,γ). We can also construct the distribution
of preferences conditional on observable consumer characteristics, X; f(αi, βi, γi|X).
These observable characteristics can be demographic variables or measures of the
overall diet or grocery purchasing behavior of the household to which the individual
belongs.
A number of papers (see, for instance, Berry et al. (1995), Nevo (2001) and
Berry et al. (2004)) show that incorporating consumer level preference heterogene-
ity is important for enabling choice models to capture realistic switching patterns
across products.25 A few paper use non-parametric methods to relax parametric
restrictions on random coefficient distributions.26 Like these papers we model con-
sumer specific preferences, however in contrast to them, we treat the preferences
as parameters to be estimated and thereby avoid having to make independence
assumptions to integrate out the density. This allows us to flexibly relate the pref-
erence parameters and individual specific effects of policy simulations to observable
attributes of consumers. Unlike in a random coefficient approach we do not need to
a priori specify how the preference distribution depends on exogenous attributes of
consumers, and we can relate individual specific effects to any observable attributes
of consumers (such as other aspects of their grocery purchasing behavior).27
24These data are from the Met Office Historic station data, are reported monthly for 35 lo-
cations in the UK, and are available at https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/public/weather/climate-
historic/#?tab=climateHistoric
25Lewbel and Pendakur (2017) show similar results apply in non-linear continuous choice mod-
els, with the incorporation of random coefficients resulting in their model much more effectively
capturing the distributional impacts of taxation.
26Burda et al. (2008) exploit Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques and Train (2008)
uses an expectation-maximization algorithm to estimate the random coefficient distribution. Train
(2008) applies the method either with a discrete random coefficient distribution or with mixtures
of normals. Bajari et al. (2007) discretize the random coefficient distribution and use linear
estimation techniques to estimate the frequency of consumers at each fixed point.
27In an earlier version of this paper, Dubois et al. (2019), we compare our estimates to those
obtained with a standard random coefficients model, and show that the two models yield similar
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One potential concern is that our estimates may be subject to an incidental
parameter problem that is common in non-linear panel data estimation. Even if
both N → ∞ and T → ∞, asymptotic bias may remain, although it shrinks as
the sample size rises (Hahn and Newey (2004), Arellano and Hahn (2007)). The
long T dimension of our data helps lower the chance that the incidental parameter
problem leads to large biases. We implement the split sample jackknife procedure
suggested in Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) and in Section 5.1 show that our max-
imum likelihood and jackknife estimates are similar and that the bias correction
does not materially affect our results.
Another benefit of having large T for each individual is that we can allow for
consumers who may have sufficiently strong distaste for some product sets such that
they will never choose to buy them. We identify consumers that never purchase
products with particular characteristics (e.g. options that contain sugar) over the
long time dimension of our data as having zero probability of purchasing products
with that characteristic. This is in contrast to standard logit discrete choice demand
models where it is assumed that all consumers have non-zero purchase probabilities
for all products available to them.
In particular, any individuals that never purchase sugary drinks or snacks reveal
a strong distaste for sugar (which we denote by βi = −∞), and any individuals
who never purchase non-sugary drinks or non-sugary snacks reveal a strong taste
for sugar (which we denote by βi = ∞). For individuals that sometimes purchase
sugary options and at other times non-sugary options, their sugar preferences is
such that βi ∈ (−∞,∞).
To specify the set of options that consumers have non-zero probabilities for, it is
useful to define the product sets Ωs and Ωn, which denote the sets of sugary drinks
and non-sugary drinks. We can then define consumer i specific sets of options with
non-zero purchase probabilities, denoted by Ωi, as
Ωi =

Ωs ∪ Ωn ∪ {0̄} ∪ {0} if
Ωn ∪ {0} if




We measure the consumer level product sets Ωi thanks to the large T dimension of
observed consumer level choices. We ignore the finite sample measurement error on
Ωi as Monte Carlo simulations show that such error is negligible in our application
where T is relatively large.28
estimates of market level demand curves, but the random coefficient model is not able to capture
the rich correlation in preferences and consumer attributes.
28Further details available from authors on request.
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For drinks products j ∈ {1, . . . , J} we define:
vijr(τ)t(τ) ≡αipjr(τ)t(τ) + βisj1{βi∈(−∞,∞)} + γiwj
ηijr(τ)t(τ) ≡δκd(i)κijτ + δad(i)ab(j)t(τ) + δhd(i)hc(i)t(τ) + δzd(i)zj + ξd(i)b(j)t(τ) + ζd(i)b(j)r(τ)
such that equation (3.1) can be written
Uijτ = vijr(τ)t(τ) + ηijr(τ)t(τ) + εijτ .
The assumption that (εi0τ , εi0̄τ , εi1τ , ..., εiJτ ) are idiosyncratic shocks independently
distributed type I extreme value means that the consumer level choice probabilities
are given by the multinomial logit formula, such that the choice probability of
consumer i on choice occasion τ purchasing any drinks product j ∈ Ωr(τ) can be
written29
Piτ (j) =
1{j∈Ωi} exp(vijr(τ)t(τ) + ηijr(τ)t(τ))
1{0∈Ωi} + 1{0̄∈Ωi} exp(βi) +
∑
k∈Ωi∩Ωr(τ) exp(vikr(τ)t(τ) + ηikr(τ)t(τ))
(3.2)
Denote consumer i’s sequence of choices across all choice occasions as yi =











which is globally concave with respect to all parameters.
3.2 Identification
Our main identification challenge is to pin down the causal impact of price on
demand. Our strategy for doing this relies on two sources of price variation. First,
conditional on brand-time and retailer type-drink type effects, we exploit cross-
retailer type variation in the relative prices of different drinks products. This arises
because we observe individuals making purchases in different retailers across time
(and thereby facing different price vectors). An important identifying assumption is
that retailer choice is not driven by shocks to demand for a specific drinks product,
29Of course the probability that consumer i at occasion τ purchases a good j /∈ Ωr(τ) is zero.
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but rather variation in where individuals shop is driven by other factors in daily life,
in which individuals move between home, school, leisure or work. Second, we exploit
variation in prices within brand across different containers and sizes. We allow for
the possibility of time varying shocks to brand level demand, but we assume there
is no aggregate shocks within brand for different container types. We discuss each
source of variation in turn.30
The price vector an individual faces at the point of purchase depends on which
retailer they visit. These retailers include a set of large national retailers that price
nationally, smaller retailers with regionally varying prices and vending machines
(see Table 2.3). We include demographic group specific time varying brand effects
ξd(i)b(j)t(τ) and retailer type effects, interacted with the drink types, ζd(i)b(j)r(τ).
31 The
former capture aggregate (demographic specific) fluctuations in brand demand over
time and the latter capture any differential propensity of consumers to choose differ-
ent drink types across retailers. Conditional on these, the cross-retailer differences
in prices provide a useful source of price variation.
There are a number of potential concerns with exploiting this type of price
variation that we need to address. First, an issue would arise if individual level
demand shocks to specific soft drinks products drive store choice; for instance, if
consumers that have a demand shock in favor of Coca Cola are driven by this to
choose a retailer that temporarily has a low price for that product, and, if instead
they had a demand shock in favor of Pepsi they would have selected a retailer with
a relatively low Pepsi price. Such behavior would occur either if consumers could
predict fluctuating relative prices across retailers or if they visited several retailers
in search of a low price draw for the product they are seeking. We find either
scenario unlikely in the case of soft drinks.
Second, an issue would arise if there are time varying retailer type specific de-
mand shocks that are contemporaneously correlated with prices. In the UK market
the vast majority of soft drinks advertising is done nationally and by the manu-
facturer, and we control for this in demand, including the regional variation due
to regional broadcasting of some TV channels.32 We also control for regional vari-
30In a previous Working Paper version of the paper (Dubois et al. (2019)) we provide descriptive
statistics that illustrate the price variation individuals face, and that the monthly prices we use
in estimation reflect actual variation in underlying transaction prices.
31Specifically, the time varying brand effects include Coca Cola, Coca Cola other brands, Pepsi,
Glaxo brands, Irn Bru, the composite “other” soft drinks, non-soft drinks, and each of the two
outside options interacted with year and quarter effects. The retailer type-drink type effects
include branded soft drinks, the composite “other” soft drinks, fruit juice, water, and each of the
two outside options interacted with the store types shown in Table 2.3.
32Targeted price discounts through use of coupons – common in the US (see Nevo and Wolfram
(2002)) – is not a common feature of the UK market.
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ation in weather conditions. Conditional on these (and retailer type effects), we
assume the residual cross retailer type price variation is driven by cost differences,
by random price reduction strategies and by store specific decisions related to unan-
ticipated excess stock.
The second source of price variation we exploit is non-linear pricing across con-
tainer sizes. This price variation is not collinear with the size effects, and the
extent of non-linear pricing varies over time and retailers. This source of identify-
ing variation would be invalid if there were systematic shocks anticipated by firms
to consumers’ valuation of container sizes that were differential across brand after
conditioning on time varying brand effects and container size and type effects. It
seems more plausible that such tilting of brand price schedules is driven by cost vari-
ations that are not proportional to pack size, differential pass-through of cost shocks
and differences in how brand advertising affects demands for different pack sizes.
This identification argument is similar to that in Bajari and Benkard (2005). In an
application to the computer market they assume that, conditional on observables,
unobserved product characteristics are the same for products that belong to the
same model. We assume that, conditional on time-varying brand characteristics,
unobserved size specific attributes do not vary differentially across brands.
The main source of variation in the sugar content of products is between sugary
and diet varieties (with most brands being available in each variety). We identify
consumer specific preference parameters for sugary versus diet products (rather
than a preference for a marginal increase in sugar quantity). We assume that the
brand effects are common across sugary and diet varieties, and that the taste for
sugary varieties is additively separable. This means that, for example, we do not
allow the individual sugar taste to be different for Coke versus Pepsi.
3.3 Pass-through of a tax on sugary soft drinks
An important issue in estimating the impact of a tax on consumption is the extent
to which the tax is shifted onto prices. Here we present preliminary evidence of
the pass-through of the recent UK soda tax to the price of soft drinks available
in the on-the-go market. This suggests pass-through is around 100%, and accords
with much of the mounting evidence of complete pass-through of soda taxes in
other jurisdiction. We also simulate tax pass-through using a demand and supply
model. To do this we use our on-the-go demand estimates along with those for the
at-home segment (reported in Appendix C) and couple it with a Nash-Bertrand
pricing model. We report the equilibrium pass-through results in Section 5.3; the
results are similar to our descriptive evidence of tax pass-through.
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There is a growing literature that estimates the pass-through of soda taxes to
prices using data covering the implementation of the tax.33 The most common
finding is that pass-through was full or near to full (i.e. prices rose by the full
amount of the tax).34 There are a few papers that find low pass-through, mainly
studying Berkley.35 A key difference between the Berkeley setting and many of the
other jurisdictions that have implemented soda taxes is that Berkeley is compara-
tively small, meaning that cross-border shopping is easier and there will be more
competitive pressure on firms to keep prices down. The studies that look at larger
jurisdictions are more relevant to the UK setting, because the taxes cover a wider
geographical area, and therefore cross-border shopping is likely to be less important.
The broad finding (with the exception of Berkeley) of around full pass-through
of soda taxes is consistent with studies that look at pass-through of other taxes.
These include Besley and Rosen (1999), which exploits variation in state and local
sales taxes in the US and looks at the impact on prices of a number of products and
finds slight over-shifting for soft drinks products, Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001),
which analyzes the incidence of cigarette taxes in several European countries and
Kenkel (2005), which uses data on how the price of alcoholic beverages changed in
Alaska.
There is also a related literature that estimates pass-through of cost shocks.
Much of this finds under-shifting (see, for instance, Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013)
and Nakamura and Zerom (2010)). An important reason for incomplete pass-
through of cost shocks is that often not all cost components are affected by the shock.
For instance, exchange rate movements do not directly impact the cost of non-traded
inputs (Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013)). In a context where firms’ marginal costs
are observable (in the wholesale electricity market), Fabra and Reguant (2014) find
changes in marginal costs are close to fully shifted to prices.
We provide descriptive evidence of pass-through of the recently introduced Soft
Drinks Industry Levy in the UK using an event study design for prices (per liter)
of the two main brands, Coca Cola and Pepsi. The tax was introduced on 1 April
2018. We use data on transaction prices from the Kantar on-the-go survey for
sugary Coca Cola and Pepsi products covering the year before and after this date.
33Griffith et al. (2019) provide a review.
34Papers that find full or near-full pass-through include Aguilar et al. (2018), Berardi et al.
(2016), Capacci et al. (2019), Castello and Lopez-Casasnovas (2018), Cawley et al. (2018), Cawley
et al. (2018), Cawley et al. (2018), Colantuoni and Rojas (2015), Colchero et al. (2015), Goncalves
and dos Santos (2019), Powell et al. (2020), Seiler et al. (2018), Silver et al. (2017).
35Bollinger and Sexton (2018), Cawley and Frisvold (2017), Etilé et al. (2018), Falbe et al.
(2015), Rojas and Wang (2017),
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Denoting transactions by ι, we estimate the regression
trans. priceι = a+ b× Iι[tax] +Xιc+ eι (3.4)
where Iι[tax] is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the transaction took place on or
after 1 April 2018, and Xι includes dummy variables for brand, pack size, month
and store type. We report coefficient estimates in Table 3.1, both for all sugary
Coca Cola and Pepsi products together, and estimated separately by the two main
on-the-go pack sizes (330ml can and 500ml bottles).
The Soft Drinks Industry Levy placed a tax of 24 pence per liter on the sugar
variants of Coke and Pepsi. This tax rate is subject to 20% VAT; therefore a price
increase of 28.8 pence per liter associated with the tax represents full pass-through.
The estimates in Table 3.1 suggest that prices of these products increased by 28
pence when all considered together. The prices of smaller pack sizes increased
by slightly less, 24.1 pence per liter, and prices of larger pack size increased by
slightly more, 29.4 pence. In Appendix E we report simulated pass-through based
on our demand estimates and a classical supply side Nash-Bertrand pricing oligopoly
model. We find similar patterns; the structural model does a reasonable job of
predicting the pass-through patterns that have resulted from the recently introduced
UK soda tax.
Table 3.1: Pass-through of UK sugar tax
All 330ml 500ml
After tax 0.280 0.241 0.294
(0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
Constant 2.310 2.007 2.291
(0.026) (0.057) (0.032)
N 10179 3920 6259
Notes: We regress the price of Coca Cola (including Cherry Coke) and Pepsi products that were
subject to the Soft Drinks Industry Levy on a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the imple-
mentation of the tax on 1 April 2018. The data runs from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2019. All
regressions include brand dummies, pack size dummies, month dummies and store type dummies.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
3.4 Estimated preference coefficients and elasticities
In Table 3.2 we summarize the distribution of estimated consumer specific pref-
erence parameters (upper section) obtained by maximizing the likelihood function
(equation 3.3). We report means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis of the
estimates parameters, as well as the covariance between them. These numbers are
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based on the finite portion of the joint preference distribution. In the lower part of
the table we report the coefficients on the at-home inventory, product advertising
and air temperature. These coefficients vary across demographic groups (age and
gender).
Table 3.2: Demand model estimates
Estimate Standard
Variable error
Moments of distribution of consumer specific preferences
Price (αi) Mean -3.1461 0.0228
Standard deviation 2.3311 0.0157
Skewness -0.9726 0.0340
Kurtosis 4.3029 0.1291
Drinks (γi) Mean 2.0180 0.0396
Standard deviation 2.4239 0.0171
Skewness 0.6235 0.0361
Kurtosis 3.9720 0.0711
Sugar (βi) Mean 0.4456 0.0079
Standard deviation 1.5047 0.0111
Skewness -0.3126 0.0528
Kurtosis 4.5575 0.1642
Price-Drinks Covariance -4.9696 0.0744
Price-Sugar Covariance 0.2080 0.0277




















Demographic specific size-carton size effects (δz
d(i)
) Yes
Time-demographic-brand effects (ξd(i)b(j)t) Yes
Retailer-demographic-brand effects (ζd(i)b(j)r(τ)) Yes
Notes: We estimate demand on a sample of 2,449 individuals who we observe on 616,544 on-the-go choice occa-
sions. Consumers choose between the products listed in Table 2.2 and the outside options of purchasing a sugary
or non-sugary snack. Estimates of the consumer specific preferences are summarized in the table. Moments of
distribution are computed using estimates of consumer specific preference parameters. These moments are based
on consumers with finite parameters and omit the top and bottom percentile of each distribution. Standard errors
of these moments are computed using the delta method.
In Figure 3.1 we plot the marginal preference distributions for price, and the
drink and sugar product attributes. These are based on individual level preference
estimates, so we have a measure of statistical significance for each individual; this
is represented by the shading, which indicates consumers with negative, positive
and indifferent (i.e. not statistically significantly different from zero) preferences
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for each attribute. Table 3.2 shows that moments of each of these distributions are
estimated with a high degree of precision. It is clear that the univariate prefer-
ence distributions depart significantly from normality (which is typically imposed
in random coefficient models) – this is apparent both in the negative skew for price
preferences and the positive skew for drinks preferences, as well as the infinite por-
tions of sugar preference distribution.
Figure 3.1: Univariate distributions of consumer specific preference parameters –
on-the-go
Notes: Distributions are based on individual level preference parameter estimates for the 2,449 individuals in the
on-the-go estimation sample. We trim the top and bottom percentile of the finite portion of each distribution. The
shading denote statistical significance of individual level preference estimates at the 95% level.
The estimates of the consumer specific preference parameters reveal a large
degree of heterogeneity across individuals – the standard deviation for price pref-
erences is 2.3 (with a coefficient of variation of 0.7), while the standard deviation
for drinks and sugar preferences are 2.4 and 1.6. Price sensitive consumers tend to
have relatively strong drinks preferences (the correlation coefficient between price
and drinks preferences is -0.9).36 We show contour plots of the bivariate preference
distributions in Appendix B.
The lower section of Table 3.1 shows the demographic specific preferences es-
timates for at-home inventories, product level advertising and temperature. As in
the descriptive analysis in Section 2.3, the impact of recent at-home purchases of
36The coefficient of variation of price preferences is given by the ratio of the reported standard
deviation and mean (2.33/3.15=0.73) and the correlation coefficient of price and drinks preferences
is given by the reported covariance divided by the product of the reported standard deviations
(-5.00/(2.33*2.42)=-0.89)
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drinks on utility on-the-go from drinks is positive and very small. For instance,
allowing the at-home inventory to fully deplete to zero for sugary soft drinks, re-
sults on average in an increase in annual volume per person demanded of on-the-go
sugary soft drinks of just 0.33 liters (equivalent to 1 can of Coca Cola). Higher
levels of advertising for a product has a statistically significant and positive effect
on utility from that product for males (but not females). All demographic groups
obtain more utility from drinks on hotter days.
Table 3.3: Category level price elasticity
Effect of 1% price increase on:
Own cross demand for: Total
demand diet sugary non-sugary drinks
effect soft drinks alternatives alternatives demand
Soft drinks -1.29 1.271 1.719 -0.703
[-1.30, -1.27] [1.248, 1.287] [1.704, 1.739] [-0.706, -0.690]
Sugary soft drinks -1.58 0.609 0.956 0.739 -0.468
[-1.60, -1.56] [0.596, 0.614] [0.937, 0.968] [0.731, 0.752] [-0.471, -0.459]
Notes: We simulate the effect of a 1% price increase for all soft drinks (row 1) and all sugary soft drinks (row
2) and report the change in demand for those product sets in column 1. In column 2-4 we report the effect on
demand for alternative product sets and in the final column we report the change in demand for all drinks. 95%
confidence bands are shown in brackets.
We report price elasticities for all products in Table B.1 in Appendix B. A
couple of interesting patterns are apparent. First, consumers are more willing to
switch from sugary soft drinks products to alternative sugary soft drinks and from
diet products to diet alternatives than they are between sugary and diet products.
Second, the price elasticities for the 500ml products are smaller in magnitude than
for the 330ml versions; consumers that choose to buy the larger bottle variants
rather than smaller cans tend to be less willing to switch away from their chosen
product in response to a price increase. Table 3.3 reports the effect on demand of
a marginal increase in the price of all sugary soft drinks and in the price of all soft
drinks (i.e. both sugary and diet). The own price elasticity for soft drinks is -1.29.
This is smaller than the own price elasticity of any individual soft drink product.
The own price elasticity for sugary soft drinks is -1.58. This is larger than for all
soft drinks, reflecting that some consumers respond to an increase in the price of
sugary soft drinks by switching to diet alternatives.37
37To calculate the confidence intervals on elasticities we obtain the variance-covariance matrix
for the parameter vector estimates using standard asymptotic results. We then take 100 draws
of the parameter vector from the joint normal asymptotic distribution of the parameters and,
for each draw, compute the elasticity, using the resulting distribution across draws to compute
Monte Carlo confidence intervals. Note these bands will not necessarily be symmetric around the
estimate.
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3.5 Relationship with individual attributes
A key feature of our model is that it allows us to flexibly relate preference param-
eters to the characteristics of individual consumers. This enables us to address the
question of how effective soda taxes are at targeting the demographic groups whose
behavior policymakers would like to change.
Figure 3.2: Preference variation with age
(a) price preferences (b) drink preferences
(c) infinite sugar preferences (d) finite sugar preferences
Notes: Figures show how the mean of price preferences, the mean of drinks preferences, the share of consumers with
infinite sugar preferences and the mean of finite sugar preferences vary by age groups. 95% confidence intervals
are shown by bars.
In Figure 3.2 we show how features of the preference distribution vary with
age.38 Panels (a) and (b) show how preferences over price and drinks vary across
consumers based on six age bands. There is relatively little variation in the average
of these preferences across age groups, with the exception that the oldest group
have relatively strong preferences for drinks (indicating, all else equal, a relatively
high likelihood that they choose a drink over a snack). However, there is consider-
able variation in sugar preferences across age. Panel (c) shows how the fraction of
consumers with infinitely negative and positive sugar preferences varies with age –
a higher fraction of individuals aged below 30 have infinitely positive sugar prefer-
ences (i.e. are only ever observed buying sugary varieties) than older individuals.
38The confidence bands in Figures 3.2-4.2 capture both estimation error in individual level
parameters and statistical uncertainty associated with the reported mean effects being based on
a sample of individuals.
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Panel (d) shows that, for those individuals with finite sugar preferences (98.5% of
the sample), the mean sugar preference for the youngest group of individuals is
considerably higher than for those aged 22-30, who in turn tend to have stronger
sugar preferences than those aged above 30.
Figure 3.3: Preference variation with total annual dietary sugar
(a) price preferences (b) drink preferences
(c) infinite sugar preferences (d) finite sugar preferences
Notes: Figures show how the mean of price preferences, the mean of drinks preferences, the share of consumers
with infinite sugar preferences and the mean of finite sugar preferences vary by deciles of the distribution of total
annual dietary sugar. 95% confidence intervals are shown by bars.
Figure 3.3 summarizes variation in preferences across deciles of the distribution
of total annual dietary sugar (measured as the share of household total at-home
calories from added sugar). Preferences governing on-the-go drinks demand are
strongly related to total annual dietary sugar. Individuals in higher deciles of the
added sugar distribution are likely to be less price sensitive and are more likely to
have strong (or infinite) preferences for sugar than those from lower deciles of the
added sugar distribution. The strong association between added sugar decile and
sugar preferences is not mechanical – the former is measured based on household
level at-home purchases across all groceries, the latter is estimated from individual
choice on-the-go among drinks products. Conversely, the drinks preference parame-
ters are higher for those in the bottom three deciles of the added sugar distribution
relative to those in higher deciles.
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Figure 3.4 shows that there is also a relationship between preferences and deciles
of the distribution of total annual equivalized grocery expenditure (a proxy for
income). There is a gradient for price, drink and sugar preference parameters;
those from low income households typically have somewhat stronger drink and
sugar preferences parameters and are typically more price sensitive than richer
individuals.
Figure 3.4: Preference variation with total annual equivalized grocery expenditure
(a) price preferences (b) drink preferences
(c) infinite sugar preferences (d) finite sugar preferences
Notes: Figures show how the mean of price preferences, the mean of drinks preferences, the share of consumers
with infinite sugar preferences and the mean of finite sugar preferences vary by deciles of the distribution of total
annual equivalized grocery expenditure. 95% confidence intervals are shown by bars.
4 Effects of a soda tax on sugar intake on-the-go
We use our demand estimates to simulate the introduction of a tax levied on sugary
soft drinks. We consider a tax rate of 25 pence per liter. This is close to the tax rate
that has very recently been introduced in the UK, and it corresponds to around 1
cents per ounce – similar to the soda tax rates in place in the US. In our simulation
we apply the tax rate to sugar sweetened soft drinks (treating pure fruit juices and
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drinks containing milk as exempt). This tax base corresponds to that in the UK
and several of the US taxes.39
Concretely, denote the set of sugary soft drinks (i.e. those products the tax
applies to) by Ωws and let π denote the tax rate and lj the volume (in liters) of








We study the impact of the tax on individual on-the-go sugar consumption. In
Section 5.2 we provide evidence that variation in responses to price changes across
households in the at-home segment are unlikely to undo our conclusions about the
targeting of the policy on individuals based on on-the-go demand estimates. Based
on the evidence of close to 100% tax pass-through of soda taxes (discussed in Section
3.3) we present our main results assuming 100% pass-through. In Section 5.3 we
show that our findings are robust to simulated pass-through based on an equilibrium
oligopoly pricing model.
4.1 How well targeted is the tax?
Our tax simulation suggests that consumers that purchase soft drinks will, on av-
erage, lower the total amount of sugar they purchase from soft drinks on-the-go
by around 245g per year; the average percentage reduction is 21%. Some of this
reduction is offset by switching to alternative (non-taxed) drinks that contain sugar
– the average reduction in sugar from non-alcoholic drinks is 222g. There is also
some substitution away from drinks towards alternative snacks. Our demand model
captures switching towards both non-sugary and sugary alternatives. Switching to-
wards sugary snacks is relatively modest – the overall average reduction in sugar
on-the-go resulting from the tax is 216g. The limited degree of switching from
drinks to snacks is consistent with experimental evidence that calories from liquids
do not displace those from solids (see, for instance, DiMeglio and Mattes (2000),
DellaValle et al. (2005) and Flood et al. (2006)). The distribution of reductions in
sugar on-the-go is right skewed with the 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles being 267g,
539g and 806g.
39Though not Philadelphia, which also taxes artificially sweetened soft drinks. In an earlier
version of this paper, Dubois et al. (2019), we show simulations of a broader tax that also applies
to diet soft drinks.
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Key to understanding the effectiveness of a soda tax is whether it successfully
achieves reductions in sugar amongst the targeted groups of consumers – the young,
those in low-income households and those with high total annual dietary sugar. In
Figure 4.1 we show how the effects of the tax vary across these characteristics.
Panels (a)–(c) show how the mean reduction for soft drink purchasers in sugar from
soft drinks, all non-alcoholic drinks and from all sugar purchased on-the-go varies
across the distribution of individual age, total annual dietary sugar and total annual
equivalized grocery expenditure.40 Panels (d)–(e) show how the mean reduction
in sugar on-the-go varies jointly with pairs of age, total dietary sugar, and total
equivalized expenditure.
Panels (a)–(c) show that the tax on sugary soft drinks achieves relatively large
reductions in sugar among the young and those from households with relatively
low total equivalized expenditure (our proxy for income), but it is not successful at
targeting those individuals with high total dietary sugar (in particular, those in the
higher deciles of the distribution).
Young consumers are both more likely to be impacted by the policy and, condi-
tional on this, exhibit bigger level responses than older groups. While the average
percent reduction in sugar on-the-go is slightly lower for those aged below 22 (14%
vs 15% across all individuals), this group obtains a relatively large amount of sugar
from products targeted by the tax. This means their level reductions are larger. A
similar, if less stark, pattern is true across the equivalized expenditure distribution
– those in low deciles are more likely to be soft drink purchasers (and therefore
impacted by the tax), and conditional on being so exhibit larger level reductions
in sugar.41 Individuals with high total annual dietary sugar are more likely to be
soft drinks purchasers (and therefore be impacted by the policy) than those lower
down the dietary sugar distribution. However, conditional on being affected by the
policy, their response is smaller on average in level terms (and much smaller in
percentage terms – for instance the reduction for the top decile of the dietary sugar
distribution is over 4 percentage points below that for the bottom decile).
The difference in responses across the three targeted variables can be understood
by the pattern of preference variation. While the young, those with high levels of
dietary sugar, and with low equivalized expenditure all have relatively strong sugar
40Tables 2.5–2.7 show how the fraction of individuals who are soft drink purchasers varies across
these dimensions.
41Individuals in the bottom half of the equivalized expenditure distribution lower their sugar
on-the-go slightly more in percentage terms than those in the top half (16% vs. 14%). This finding
mirrors Allcott et al. (2019a) who find in the US that low income households are slightly more
price elastic.
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preferences, unlike the other groups those with higher levels of dietary sugar also
are relatively price insensitive.
Figure 4.1: Reductions in sugar from drinks
(a) by age (b) by total annual dietary sugar
(c) by total annaul equivalized grocery
expenditure
(d) by age and total annual dietary
sugar
(e) by age and total annaul equivalized
grocery expenditure
(f) by total annual dietary sugar and
total annaul equivalized grocery expen-
diture
Notes: Figure is based on the 2,449 individuals in the on-the-go estimation sample. It shows how average reduction
in annual sugar on-the-go varies across the distributions of individual age, total annual dietary sugar and total
annual equivalized grocery expenditure. Panels (a)–(c) show numbers for soft drinks, all non-alcoholic drinks and
all on-the-go purchases (95% confidence bands are shown by bars); panels (d)–(f) show numbers for all on-the-go
purchases. In panels (d)–(f) age groups are 1=<22, 2=22-30, 3=31-40, 4=41-50, 5=51-60, 6=60+.
A number of things emerge from panels (d)–(f). The pattern of relatively large
responses among the young broadly holds across the deciles of both the total dietary
sugar and equivalized expenditure distributions. This suggests the tax is relatively
34
effective at achieving sugar reductions among young people in low income house-
holds. Similarly, those individuals from households in the bottom couple of deciles
of the equivalized expenditure distributions exhibit relatively large reductions in
sugar across all deciles of the total dietary sugar distribution. Among older peo-
ple, the smallest reductions in sugar are for individuals in the top half of the total
dietary sugar distribution.
4.2 Consumer welfare and redistribution
To the extent that a tax raises prices it imposes an economic burden on consumers;
with the tax in place consumers can obtain less for a given amount of expenditure
than under zero tax. In the case of a tax on sugary soft drinks, consumers that
buy sugary soft drinks will incur a welfare loss through this channel. In Figure
4.2 we describe this effect; we use our demand estimates to compute compensating
variation – the monetary amount an individual would require to be paid to be
indifferent to the imposition of the tax based on their estimated preferences – using
the standard Small and Rosen (1981) formula; see Appendix D for details.
Panels (a)-(c) show how compensating variation varies across soft drink pur-
chasers by an individual’s age, total annual dietary sugar, and total equivalized ex-
penditure. Panels (d)-(f) show how it varies jointly with pairs of age, total annual
dietary sugar, and total equivalized expenditure. Compensating variation is higher
for younger individuals, for those with high dietary sugar, and for those from house-
holds in the bottom half of the equivalized expenditure distribution. This is mainly
driven by these groups obtaining more sugar from soft drinks than other groups. The
relatively large compensating variations of the young hold broadly across individu-
als’ positions in the total annual dietary sugar or total annual equivalized grocery
expenditure distribution. Panel (f) shows that for high dietary sugar individu-
als compensating variation is relatively large across the distribution of equivalized
expenditure, however, for low dietary sugar individuals the largest compensating
variations are among those at the bottom of the equivalized expenditure distribu-
tion.
If consumers fully account for all costs associated with their soft drink con-
sumption, then compensating variation would capture the total effects of the tax
on consumer welfare and we could conclude that the tax makes all purchasers of
sugary soft drinks worse off, with the largest effects being among the young, those
with high levels of dietary sugar, and those from relatively poor households. How-
ever, if sugary soft drink consumption is associated with future costs that are not
taken account of by the individual at the point of consumption, then compensating
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variation based on revealed preference captures only part of the total consumer
welfare effect of the tax.42
Figure 4.2: Revealed consumer welfare effect
(a) by age (b) by total annual dietary sugar
(c) by total annual grocery equivalized
expenditure
(d) by age and total annual dietary
sugar
(e) by age and total annual grocery
equivalized expenditure
(f) by total dietary sugar and total an-
nual grocery equivalized expenditure
Notes: Figure is based on the 2,449 individuals in the on-the-go estimation sample. It shows how average compen-
sating variation varies across the distributions of individual age, total dietary sugar and total equivalized grocery
expenditure. In panels (a)–(c) 95% confidence bands are shown by bars. In panels (d)–(f) age groups are 1=<22,
2=22-30, 3=31-40, 4=41-50, 5=51-60, 6=60+.
Policymakers have particularly focused on concerns about high consumption
amongst children and young adults. The average compensating variation for in-
dividuals aged 13-21 who are soft drink purchasers is £4.94, while the average
42Plus savings in averted public health externalities, and the use of tax revenue raised from the
tax may indirectly impact on consumer welfare.
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reduction in sugar for this group is 280g. If the internality associated with drinking
the amount of sugar in a can of Coca Cola is above £0.62, then for the average
person aged 13-21 the soda tax will be welfare improving. If tax revenue, which
is £3.14 per person, is redistributed lump-sum to soft drink purchasers then this
threshold would be £0.23 per can of Coca Cola (or £0.02 per ounce).
A common concern about excise taxes is that they are regressive. This is typi-
cally based on the observation that those with lower incomes tend to be relatively
heavy consumers of the taxed products (which, for a small change in price, is a good
approximation to compensating variation based on revealed preference). Table 2.7
confirms that, in the case of sugary soft drinks, poorer individuals (those with low
total annual equivalized grocery expenditure) are more likely to be soft drink pur-
chasers and to get more sugar from these products; those in the bottom half of
the distribution are around 10% more likely to be soft drink purchasers than those
in the top half, and conditional on being one, on average obtain 15% more sugar
from these products. Our demand estimates suggest that compensating variation
for a tax on sugary soft drinks is around 19% higher, on average, for soft drink
purchasers in the bottom half of total equivalized grocery expenditure distribution
than for those in the top half (see Figure 4.2(c)).
However, if some consumers impose internalities on themselves, then compen-
sating variation measured on the basis of revealed preference provides an incomplete
picture of the redistributive effects of the tax (a point made by Gruber and Koszegi
(2004) in the case of cigarette taxation). The mean sugar reductions from the tax
are somewhat higher on average among those towards the bottom of the equival-
ized grocery expenditure distribution compared to those further up (for instance,
the average reduction in sugar for those in the bottom half of the distribution is
20% higher than those in the top half). Therefore, if internalities exist and the
marginal internality from sugar consumption is constant across the expenditure
distribution, the larger reductions in sugar among low spending individuals will act
to offset the compensating variation difference. If, at the margin, internalities are
larger for poorer individuals (as argued, for instance, by Allcott et al. (2019a)), this
will increase the likelihood that overall the tax is progressive.
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5 Robustness
5.1 Bias correction for incidental parameters problem
In our non-linear model with fixed effects maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters may suffer from an incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott
(1948)). Even if both N →∞ and T →∞, if N and T grow at the same rate (N
T
→
ρ where ρ is a non zero constant), our fixed effect estimator will be asymptotically
biased (Arellano and Hahn (2007)).
A range of bias correction methods exist that reduce the bias from order 1/T to
1/T 2 (see surveys in Arellano and Hahn (2007), Arellano and Bonhomme (2011)).
We use panel jackknife methods (Hahn and Newey (2004)), employing the split
sample procedure suggested in Dhaene and Jochmans (2015). This entails obtaining
estimates of the model parameters θ = (α,β,γ,η) based on splitting the sample
into two non-overlapping random sub-samples. Each sub-sample contains one half
of the choice occasions for each individual. We denote the maximum likelihood
estimate for the full sample θ̂ and the estimate for the two subsamples θ̂(1,T/2) and
θ̂(T/2,T ). The jackknife (bias corrected) estimator is:
θ̃split = 2θ̂ −
θ̂(1,T/2) + θ̂(T/2,T )
2
.
In Figure 5.1 we graph the difference between the jackknife (bias corrected) and
maximum likelihood sugar preference parameters for the on-the-go segment. Panel
(a) shows the distribution of estimates (for those with finite sugar preferences) for
the maximum likelihood and jackknife estimates. Panel (b) shows how the difference
in these estimates relates to the number of choice occasions a consumer is observed
on in the sample. Panels (c) and (d) show how the difference relates to consumers’
age and total dietary sugar.
The difference between the two estimates is small; the standard deviation of the
sugar preference parameter estimates is 1.6, while the average absolute difference
between the jackknife and maximum likelihood estimates is 0.02. The difference is
decreasing in T ; individuals in the sample for a relatively small number of choice
occasions tend to have higher differences than those in the sample relatively many
times. However, conditional on T , the average difference between the jackknife and
maximum likelihood estimates is zero – a positive difference is equally likely as a
negative difference. Indeed, the distribution of the maximum likelihood and jack-
knife estimates of the preference parameters are almost indistinguishable and the
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difference between the jackknife and maximum likelihood estimates is completely
unrelated to individuals’ age or total annual dietary sugar.
In Appendix B.1 we show that similar conclusions to those for sugar hold for
estimated price and drink preferences; the maximum likelihood and jackknife proce-
dures yield almost identical preference distributions, any individual level differences
are relatively small and are equally likely to be positive or negative and there is no
systematic relationship with the key demographic variables of interest. For instance,
the average absolute difference between the jackknife and maximum likelihood price
estimates is 0.05 (relative to a mean price preferences of -3.15). As a consequence,
our results regarding the effectiveness of soda taxes are robust to the bias correction
procedure.
Figure 5.1: Sugar preference parameters
(a) kernel density (b) bias by T
(c) bias by age (d) bias by total annaul dietary sugar
Notes: Graphs are based on preferences estimates in the on-the-go segment. In panels (b)-(d) markers represent
consumer level differences. Lines are local polynomial regressions.
5.2 Effects in the at-home segment
Our main interest in this paper is the on-the-go segment of the soft drinks market,
which has been much less well studied than the at-home segment. To say anything
about individual level outcomes with household level at-home data would require
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placing structure on how purchases are shared within the household. Our use of
on-the-go data enables us to avoid this.
A possible issue is that our conclusion that soda taxes are well targeted at
young people could be unwound by at-home demand responses. To assess this
possibility we estimate a model of demand in the at-home segment, which we specify
similarly to our on-the-go demand model. We provide details in Appendix C.2. We
assume consumers solve a static problem, controlling for at-home inventories, which
allow for non-separabilities over time in purchasing that arise through the storable
nature of drinks (allowing, for instance, for the possibility that a household that
has recently bought drinks is, as a consequence of the recent purchase, less likely to
buy them on the next choice occasion). Hendel and Nevo (2006b) and Wang (2015)
provide evidence that in the US soft drinks market consumers behave in a forward-
looking way, intertemporally switching the timing of purchases when buying on sale.
Hendel and Nevo (2006a) show that this behavior can bias static demand estimates.
This is a threat to our at-home demand estimates (and underlines an advantage of
studying on-the-go demand).43 In our at-home demand model we also treat retailer
choice as exogenous, assuming it is not driven by demand shocks for drinks.
Figure 5.2: Reductions in sugar from drinks in on-the-go and at-home segments
Notes: Figure is based on the 5,550 individuals in the full on-the-go sample, and data on the households to which
they belong in the at-home data. It shows the reduction in sugar from drinks achieved by the tax by age groups
in both on-the-go and at-home segments. Numbers are expressed relative to the average reduction for those aged
younger than 22.
43Note, O’Connell and Smith (2019) present evidence that in the UK households tend to re-
spond to sales by switching across brands, pack types and sizes, and, on average, there is little
evidence in changes in the timing of purchases. This suggests any biases from ignoring forward-
looking dynamics are likely to be much smaller in the UK drinks market compared to the US
context.
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We use these estimates to simulate the impact of the soda tax on individual
level demands in the at-home segment assuming a naive within household sharing
rule based on the OECD equivalence scale. In Figure 5.2 we report the reduction
in sugar from drinks achieved by the tax for each age group relative to those aged
younger than 22. Numbers reported in this graph are for the full sample of on-the-
go individuals (i.e. including soft drink purchasers and non-soft drink purchasers).
The black line shows the on-the-go relationship. It is strongly decreasing across age
groups reflecting that a) older individuals are less likely to be on-the-go soft drinks
purchasers (see Table 2.5) and b) conditional on being soft drink purchasers, the tax
lowers their sugar from on-the-go drinks by less that it does for younger individuals
(see Figure 4.1(a)). The grey line shows the relationship based on at-home demands.
There is no obvious patterns with age – the households that the young individuals
in our on-the-go sample belong to, on average, respond approximately as strongly
than those older individuals belong to. This suggests at-home demand responses
are not likely to unwind (nor reinforce) our conclusion about the effective targeting
of soda taxes at young individuals.
5.3 Supply
The results in Section 4 are based on the assumption that the prices of taxed
products increase one-for-one with the tax (100% pass-through) and the prices of
substitute goods remain unchanged. We provide evidence in Section 3.3 that this
is the central estimate in the literature and is what seems to have happened after
the recent introduction of a soda tax in the UK. In this section we report results
based on an equilibrium model of tax pass-through. We model the supply side of
the market in the standard way (see Berry et al. (1995), Nevo (2001)), assuming
drinks firms compete in each market in a Nash-Bertrand pricing game.44
A product that is available for purchase for on-the-go and at-home consumption
has a market demand curve that depends on preferences in both segments. There-
fore in computing equilibrium tax pass-through it may be important to account
for the supply linkage through the influence of on-the-go and at-home preferences
on market demand curves and hence firm pricing. We use our on-the-go and at-
home demand estimates to derive market level demand curves. We can estimate
44We define markets by retailer-year. The retailers include the main supermarkets, Asda,
Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Tesco as well discounters, other national stores and convenience stores,
in the north, midlands and south. We assume drinks firms set final consumer prices. This is
consistent with efficient contracting between drinks firms and retailers and can be sustained by
side payments between retailers and drinks firms (see Villas-boas (2007), Bonnet and Dubois
(2010)).
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product level marginal costs using these demand estimates and assuming prices are
the equilibrium outcome of the Nash-Bertrand game. Using the demand and sup-
ply model we can simulate the impact of the soda tax on equilibrium prices. We
provide details in Appendix E.
In the top panel of Table 5.1 we report simulated price increases across all
products subject to the tax and across small variants (288-330ml) and large variants
(500ml) separately. This is the structural model analogue to the descriptive evidence
in Table 3.1. The demand and supply model predicts average pass-through of 116%
(given by 0.29/0.25). It also predicts pass-through that is higher for 500ml bottles
(124%) than for smaller sizes (104%). For large sizes demand is less elastic, and
in response to the tax, it is optimal for firms to pass-through more of the price
increase to these products, with the resulting increase in profits from intra-marginal
consumers off-setting the profit reduction associated with consumers switching away
from these products. This pattern of differential pass-through accords with the
descriptive evidence in Table 3.1. In the bottom panel of Table 5.1 we report
the average price changes for drinks not subject to the tax; in equilibrium firms
marginally lower the price of substitute drinks.
Table 5.1: Price changes under equilibrium pass-through
All 330ml 500ml
Sugar sweetened drinks
No. products 20 9 11
Pre-tax price 2.07 1.96 2.16
Price rise 0.29 0.26 0.31
Tax 0.25 0.25 0.25
Alternative drinks
No. products 16 4 12
Pre-tax price 2.11 2.13 2.10
Price rise -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Tax 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: We simulate the equilibrium pricing response to the soda tax based on a Nash-Bertrand
pricing game. The top panel reports the impact for products subject to the tax. The bottom panel
reports the impact for drinks products exempt from the tax.
In Figure 5.3 we show how the total reduction in sugar on-the-go due to the tax
varies with age, total dietary sugar and equivalized grocery expenditure under 100%
tax pass-through (repeating information in Figure 4.1) and under equilibrium tax
pass-through based on our demand and supply model. The figure makes clear that
the patterns of price changes across these key targeted demographics is the same
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under the alternative pass-through assumptions. The only difference is a constant
level shift; the fact that the equilibrium model predicts that firms’ optimal response
amplifies the price differential between sugary and alternative drinks created by the
tax results in somewhat higher reductions in sugar relative to under 100% pass-
through.
Figure 5.3: Reductions in sugar from drinks under 100% and equilibrium pass-
through
(a) by age
(b) by total annual dietary
sugar
(c) by total annaul equivalized
grocery expenditure
Notes: Figure shows how the average reduction in annual sugar on-the-go varies across the distributions of individ-
ual age, total dietary sugar and total equivalized grocery expenditure under 100% and equilibrium tax pass-through.
6 Summary and conclusion
Excise taxes have traditionally been applied to alcohol, tobacco and gambling, in
part to tackle socially costly consumption. Recently there has been a drive to extend
them to cover some of foods and drinks, with soda taxes being at the vanguard
of this move. In the case of sugar, there is clear evidence that most individuals
exceed official recommendations on how much to consume (Griffith et al. (2020)).
Policymakers have targeted young people, individuals with high total dietary sugar
and low income people. We evaluate how well targeted a soda tax on those groups
whose behavior policymakers wish to change.
We provide an analysis based on individual level choice behavior while on-the-go;
to our knowledge we are the first to study this segment of the market. Our results
show that young consumers would lower their sugar consumption by more than older
individuals in response to a soda tax. The tax does therefore succeed in achieving
relatively large reductions in sugar among one targeted group. However, the young
also loose out most in terms of direct consumer surplus loss due to higher prices. If
young people’s soft drinks consumption give rise to future costs that the partially
ignore at the point on intake, then gains from averted internalities may outweigh
this loss in consumer surplus. The performance of the tax in terms of reducing the
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on-the-go sugar intake of those with the most sugary diets is less good. Those with
high total dietary sugar are relatively price inelastic and so respond less to the tax,
so their sugar consumption falls by less than more moderate sugar consumers. If
internalities are important, the redistributive properties of the tax are likely to be
more attractive than suggested by an analysis based purely on traditional economic
tax incidence. The traditional economic burden of the tax falls, to a moderate
extent, disproportionately on low income households, but the poor also lower their
sugar consumption to a somewhat larger extent and therefore if they benefit from
averted internalities this could outweigh the loss of consumer surplus.
We provide evidence of the pricing responses of soft drinks manufacturers to the
tax. However, firms may respond by adjusting other elements of their strategies.
For instance, they may change the extent and focus of their advertising and they
may introduce new products that are outside the scope of the tax. Our results
therefore provide a picture to the short-medium run impact of soda taxes. An
important direction for future work will be to incorporate these elements of firm
response into analysis of these forms of tax.
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Online Appendix
How well targeted are soda taxes?
Pierre Dubois, Rachel Griffith and Martin O’Connell
A Data appendix
A.1 Patterns of sugar consumption
In this appendix we use data from the National Diet and Nutrition Survey 2008-
2011, which is an intake study of a representative sample of 3,073 UK adults and
children. In Figure A.1 we document widespread excess consumption of added
sugar. Panel (a) shows the cumulative distribution of calories from added sugar
per day (separately for females and males) and panel (b) shows the cumulative
distribution of the share of calories from added sugar. In both graphs we denote
recommended medical levels with vertical lines. In the case of the level of calories
from added sugar, the American Heart Association recommends no more than 100
calories per day from added sugar for females, and no more than 150 for males. In
the case of the share of calories from added sugar, the World Health Organization
recommends that ideally fewer than 5% of calories should be obtained from added
sugar. The figure makes clear that the majority of individuals exceed these targets
by a considerable amount.
Figure A.1: Cumulative density of calories from added sugar
(a) Calories from added sugar (b) % of calories from added sugar
Notes: Numbers using National Diet and Nutrition Survey 2008-2011 for a representative sample of 3,073 UK
adults and children. For each distribution we trim the top percentile. Vertical lines denote medical guidelines.
In Figure A.2 we show local polynomial regressions describing how the calories
from (the sugar in) soft drinks vary with age, share of calories from added sugar
and equivalized household income. The figure shows that young individuals, those
1
with a high share of calories from added sugar, and those from relatively low income
households obtain relatively large amounts of calories from soft drinks.
Figure A.2: Sugar from soft drinks
(a) by age (b) by calories from added sugar
(c) by equivalized income
Notes: Numbers using National Diet and Nutrition Survey 2008-2011 for a representative sample of 3,073 UK
adults and children. Lines are based on local polynomial regressions. Shaded area are 95% confidence bands. For
each variable we trim the top percentile of the distribution.
In Figures A.3 and A.4 we repeat Figures A.1 and A.2 with US data. Specifically,
we use National Health and Nutrition Examination Study over 2007-2014, a sample
of 39,189 adults and children. The same patterns hold in the US. Notice, the level of
calories from soft drinks reported for the US in the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Study is higher than those reported in the UK in the National Diet
and Nutrition Survey. This may partially reflect differences in consumption levels
between the two countries, but it may also reflect differences in reporting between
the two surveys.
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Figure A.3: Patterns in the US: Cumulative density of calories from added sugar
(a) Calories from added sugar (b) % of calories from added sugar
Notes: Numbers using National Health and Nutrition Examination Study 2007-2014 for a representative sample
of 39,189 US adults and children. For each distribution we trim the top percentile. Vertical lines denote medical
guidelines.
Figure A.4: Patterns in the US: Sugar from soft drinks
(a) by age (b) by calories from added sugar
(c) by equivalized income
Notes: Numbers using National Health and Nutrition Examination Study 2007-2014 for a representative sample of
39,189 US adults and children. Lines are based on local polynomial regressions. Shaded area are 95% confidence
bands. For each variable we trim the top percentile of the distribution.
A.2 Product definition
We consider the market for chilled non-alcoholic drinks. In the raw data there are
2,950 unique product codes (UPCs) consisting of 1,065 brands (as defined by Kan-
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tar). We use data on the 598 UPCs in 89 brands that comprise 82% of transactions.
We drop niches UPCs that have very small market shares as follows:
• 975 brands that individually have a market share of less than 0.15%, ac-
counting for 2,232 UPCs. Together these account for 15% of the market; see
spreadsheet.
• 87 UPCs that are for sizes smaller than 200ml, which together account for 2%
of the market; see spreadsheet.
• 33 UPCs that are for odd size-brand combinations, that individually have
small market shares (the largest is 0.18%, the mean is 0.04%), which together
account for 1% of the market; see spreadsheet.
This leaves us with 598 UPCs in 89 brands. We group these into 37 products
as follows:
• 30 branded soft drink products, e.g. Coca Cola 330ml, Coca Cola 500ml, Coca
Cola Diet 330ml, etc.; we aggregate over 104 UPCs, for example, the product
Coca Cola 500ml is the aggregate of 2 UPCs that differ in the shape of bottle
(COCA COLA CONTOUR PET 500ML with a market share of 7.5% and
COCA COLA PET 500ML with a market share of 0.2%); together these 30
branded soft drink products account for 60% market share; see spreadsheet
• Other soda products
– regular: we aggregate 184 UPCs that individually have market shares
that range from 1.6% (Red Bull 250ml) to 0.0002% (Orangina Rouge
500ml) with a mean market share of 0.08%, and together account for
14% of the market; see spreadsheet.
– diet: we aggregate 22 UPCs that individually have market shares that
range from 0.4% (7UP Free Lemon+Limeade 600ml) to 0.001% (Lu-
cozade Sport Lite 500ml) and together account for 1.9% of the market;
see spreadsheet.
• Fruit juice: we aggregate 100 UPCs that individually all have market shares
below 1% and together account for 7.9% of the market; see spreadsheet.
• Flavoured milk: we aggregate 30 UPCs that individually have market shares
below 0.25% and together account for 1.8% of the market; see spreadsheet.
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• Fruit water: we aggregate 11 UPCs that are different flavours of Volvic Touch
of Fruit Water that together account for just under 1% of the market; see
spreadsheet.
• Water: we aggregate 146 UPCs for bottled water, which together have a
market share of 12%; see spreadsheet.
A.3 Measurement of prices
We compute the transaction level price as expenditure made for a UPC over units
purchased. For products that entail some aggregation over sizes, we adjust prices
so they are in terms of the most popular size. For instance, Pepsi 500ml involves
aggregating over 500ml and 600ml size; for transactions involving 600ml Pepsi, we
adjust the price according to p ∗ 5/6. Similarly, for the composite products we
express price in terms of the most common size.
For each product we compute the mean monthly price (across transactions) in
each retailer type. If a product-retailer type-month involves fewer than 3 transac-
tions, we replace the price with a missing value. For product-retailer type-months
with missing prices we interpolate (across weeks). We smooth the resulting price
series using a local polynomial non-parametric regression.
Figures A.5 and A.6 show the difference between the price the consumer actually
pays for the chosen product (the transaction price) and the smoothed price used in
the demand model estimation. They show that measurement error exists and exists
for all stores and if anything is slightly lower for vending machines.
Figure A.5: Difference between transaction price and smoothed price
Notes: .
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Figure A.6: Difference between transaction price and smoothed price, by store type
(a) National-large (b) National-small (c) Vending machine
(d) Regional - south (e) Regional - midlands (f) Regional - north
Notes: .
Measurement error in non-linear models is more problematic than in linear mod-
els, and even classical additive measurement error can bias parameter estimates,
unlike in linear models. However, it is useful to consider more closely the type
of measurement error we face here. The measurement errors introduced by using
imputed prices instead of true prices can be thought of coming from two errors.
First, there is an error when using a mean instead of the true variable. These errors
are “Berkson” errors (Berkson (1950)), i.e. additive on the unobserved true price
and independent of the average price used in estimation. Second, we also make an
error on the true mean price in a region-store chain when using transaction prices
because the sampling of transactions is not independent of prices.
Blundell et al. (2019) argue that “Berkson” errors are commonplace when we
observe an average price in a group rather than the true individual price, and can
lead to bias in estimates of demand. They are not classical measurement errors
independent of the true unobserved variable. Schennach (2013) proposes a solution
with instrumental variables in the context of non-parametric models with a con-
tinuous outcome variable. In a continuous demand estimation problem, Blundell
et al. (2019) develop a consistent estimator that uses external information on the
true distribution of prices in the case of demand estimation with non-separable un-
observed heterogeneity. Their results do not extend to a discrete choice model for
differentiated products demands.
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The second source of errors is due to the imputation using transaction prices.
We leave for future research the development of a consistent estimation method in
the case of discrete choices. This is a complicated problem that has not been solved.
As our imputed prices potentially suffer from both error components, we do a
simple Monte Carlo simulation to see what the extent of the bias might be in our
setting with respect to such measurement error in prices.
We consider a data generating process where individual prices paid by each
consumer are such that the prices of good j for consumer i at different occasions τ
is:
pijrtτ = pjrt + ∆ijrtτ
where ∆ijrtτ is independent of pjrt for all products j, retailers r, periods t and pur-
chase occasions τ of each consumer denoted i. We then consider the case where all
pijrtτ are not observed by the econometrician but only the transaction price.
We simulate a logit model based on the random utility of consumer i for good
j = 1, .., J on purchase occasion τ for consumer i:
Uijτ = δj − αipijr(i)t(i)τ + εijr(i)t(i)τ
with outside good Ui0τ = εi0r(i)t(i)tτ and where r(i) ∈ {1, .., R} denotes the retailers
of consumer i and t(i) ∈ {1, .., T} the period where consumer i shops. We ran-
domly draw purchase occasions across periods t(i) (these are like markets in our
application) and for simplicity we randomly assign consumers uniformly to different
retailers r(i).
Preferences for consumers i = 1, .., I are heterogeneous with αi, which is nor-
mally distributed with zero truncation (to impose that the price coefficient is neg-
ative). The price heterogeneity is calibrated to have approximately the scale of
the price distribution observed for sodas in our data and the mean utilities and
price coefficient are also chosen to calibrate approximately to the product market
shares and the outside good market share. Consumer i chooses the highest utility
alternative such that her chosen good at occasion τ is




Assuming all εijr(i)t(i)τ are i.i.d. type I extreme value, the choice probability of
j by consumer i at choice occasion τ is
Pijτ = P (yiτ = j|pi1r(i)t(i)τ , .., piJr(i)t(i)τ ) =
exp(δj − αipijr(i)t(i)τ )
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(δk − αipikr(i)t(i)τ )
and the consumer i own price elasticity for good j is eijτ ≡ ∂ lnPijτ∂ ln pijr(i)t(i)τ = −αiPijτ (1−
Pijτ ).
We observe only transaction prices piyiτ r(i)t(i)τ for the chosen product yiτ ∈
{1, .., J}. We compute average transaction prices by retailer and period as the
empirical mean of observed transaction prices:
pjrt =
1




The measurement error in prices introduce a bias in the logit estimates. In or-
der to gain intuition on how large is this bias, we compare the maximum likelihood
estimation of parameters using the true prices pijr(i)t(i)τ with estimates using the
average transaction prices pjrt.
While theoretically there remains an asymptotic bias, our results suggest that
with sufficient observations of purchases per product-retailer the bias becomes eco-
nomically irrelevant. Specifically, with sample sizes similar to those in our data we
obtain a bias in the elasticity estimates that is less than 5%.
Interestingly, the bias is small and positive on the individual price coefficients
while if we impose a common price coefficient (same αi) in the true data generating
process, the bias is small but negative. This shows that when the measurement
error is not consumer specific, but due only to ∆ijrtτ , the bias leads to an overesti-
mation of price elasticity. Intuitively this is because the mean transaction price is
underestimated (purchases occur more often when the price deviation is negative)
while the outside good price normalization is constant. When the price coefficient
is individual specific (as in our model), the measurement error is compounded with
the price sensitivity, which introduces an additional error that is correlated with αi,
and generates a bias in the other direction. Intuitively, the fact that all prices are bi-
ased (except the outside good) makes the bias on the price elasticity of demand not
too large, because choices across inside goods depend on relative prices, and it also
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implies that the bias is likely to be larger the larger is the outside good market share.
We think this problem is an interesting general issue that deserves more research
that is out of the scope of this paper.
B Further details of on-the-go demand estimates
In Figure B.1 we plot contour plots of the bivariate preference distributions.
Figure B.1: Bivariate distributions of consumer specific preference parameters
Notes: Distribution plots use consumers with finite sugar preference parameters; those having infinite sugar pref-
erences cannot be included in this graph. We trim the top and bottom 2.5% of the distribution.
In Tables B.1 we report price elasticities for all products. 95% confidence bands
are given in brackets. In column 1 we report the percent change in demand for
the product when its price increases by 1%. Columns 2-5 report how demand for
alternative products (sugary soft drinks, diet soft drinks, sugary alternative drinks
and non-sugary alternative drinks) would change and a final column reports what
would be the overall change in demand for soft drinks and alternative juices. For
example, a 1% increase in the price of a 500ml bottle of Coca Cola, would result in
a reduction in demand for that product of 2.36%. Demand for alternative sugary
soft drinks would rise by around 0.223%, demand for diet soft drinks would rise by
0.125%, demand for alternative sugary drinks would rise by 0.201% and demand
for alternative non-sugary drinks would rise by 0.129%. Demand for non-alcoholic
drinks as a whole would fall by 0.114%.
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Table B.1: Product level price elasticities
Effect of 1% price increase on:
Own cross demand for: Total
product sugary diet sugary non-sugary drinks
demand soft drinks soft drinks alternatives alternatives demand
Coca Cola 330 -2.81 0.096 0.055 0.084 0.092 -0.012
[-2.85, -2.80] [0.095, 0.098] [0.054, 0.056] [0.083, 0.086] [0.091, 0.094] [-0.012, -0.012]
Coca Cola 500 -2.36 0.223 0.125 0.201 0.129 -0.114
[-2.38, -2.30] [0.218, 0.225] [0.122, 0.126] [0.196, 0.203] [0.126, 0.131] [-0.114, -0.111]
Coca Cola Diet 330 -3.02 0.047 0.106 0.036 0.232 -0.004
[-3.05, -3.00] [0.046, 0.048] [0.104, 0.107] [0.035, 0.036] [0.228, 0.235] [-0.005, -0.004]
Coca Cola Diet 500 -2.51 0.100 0.235 0.098 0.224 -0.084
[-2.53, -2.47] [0.098, 0.102] [0.229, 0.239] [0.095, 0.100] [0.221, 0.228] [-0.085, -0.082]
Dr Pepper 330 -3.25 0.014 0.007 0.007 0.009 -0.001
[-3.30, -3.23] [0.014, 0.015] [0.007, 0.008] [0.007, 0.008] [0.009, 0.010] [-0.002, -0.001]
Dr Pepper 500 -2.64 0.035 0.020 0.031 0.020 -0.018
[-2.66, -2.59] [0.034, 0.036] [0.019, 0.020] [0.030, 0.031] [0.020, 0.021] [-0.018, -0.017]
Dr Pepper Diet 500 -2.85 0.016 0.038 0.015 0.038 -0.013
[-2.88, -2.80] [0.016, 0.016] [0.037, 0.039] [0.014, 0.015] [0.037, 0.039] [-0.013, -0.013]
Fanta 330 -2.99 0.020 0.010 0.015 0.018 -0.002
[-3.04, -2.97] [0.020, 0.020] [0.010, 0.010] [0.014, 0.015] [0.018, 0.019] [-0.003, -0.002]
Fanta 500 -2.54 0.036 0.020 0.033 0.023 -0.019
[-2.57, -2.49] [0.035, 0.037] [0.020, 0.021] [0.032, 0.034] [0.022, 0.023] [-0.019, -0.018]
Fanta Diet 500 -2.74 0.016 0.038 0.016 0.041 -0.014
[-2.77, -2.70] [0.016, 0.017] [0.036, 0.038] [0.016, 0.017] [0.040, 0.042] [-0.014, -0.014]
Cherry Coke 330 -2.99 0.014 0.006 0.009 0.011 -0.001
[-3.03, -2.97] [0.014, 0.015] [0.006, 0.007] [0.009, 0.009] [0.010, 0.011] [-0.001, -0.001]
Cherry Coke 500 -2.59 0.029 0.016 0.027 0.018 -0.015
[-2.61, -2.53] [0.029, 0.030] [0.016, 0.016] [0.026, 0.027] [0.017, 0.018] [-0.015, -0.014]
Cherry Coke Diet 500 -2.79 0.013 0.030 0.013 0.032 -0.011
[-2.81, -2.74] [0.013, 0.013] [0.029, 0.031] [0.012, 0.013] [0.031, 0.033] [-0.011, -0.011]
Oasis 500 -2.55 0.044 0.025 0.041 0.027 -0.023
[-2.58, -2.49] [0.043, 0.045] [0.024, 0.026] [0.040, 0.042] [0.026, 0.027] [-0.023, -0.022]
Oasis Diet 500 -2.72 0.020 0.047 0.020 0.047 -0.017
[-2.74, -2.68] [0.020, 0.020] [0.046, 0.048] [0.019, 0.020] [0.046, 0.048] [-0.017, -0.017]
Pepsi 330 -2.80 0.035 0.018 0.030 0.034 -0.004
[-2.84, -2.79] [0.035, 0.036] [0.018, 0.019] [0.029, 0.030] [0.034, 0.036] [-0.005, -0.004]
Pepsi 500 -2.67 0.091 0.051 0.079 0.061 -0.050
[-2.70, -2.64] [0.090, 0.093] [0.049, 0.052] [0.078, 0.081] [0.060, 0.062] [-0.050, -0.049]
Pepsi Diet 330 -3.06 0.016 0.043 0.012 0.089 -0.001
[-3.09, -3.04] [0.016, 0.016] [0.042, 0.044] [0.012, 0.013] [0.087, 0.091] [-0.002, -0.001]
Pepsi Diet 500 -2.86 0.042 0.100 0.038 0.119 -0.038
[-2.89, -2.83] [0.041, 0.042] [0.098, 0.101] [0.037, 0.039] [0.117, 0.121] [-0.038, -0.037]
Lucozade Energy 380 -2.72 0.053 0.029 0.052 0.040 -0.012
[-2.76, -2.69] [0.052, 0.055] [0.028, 0.030] [0.051, 0.054] [0.039, 0.041] [-0.012, -0.012]
Lucozade Energy 500 -2.58 0.043 0.024 0.040 0.024 -0.022
[-2.60, -2.52] [0.041, 0.044] [0.023, 0.025] [0.038, 0.041] [0.023, 0.025] [-0.022, -0.021]
Ribena 288 -2.87 0.015 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.000
[-2.92, -2.85] [0.015, 0.016] [0.007, 0.008] [0.012, 0.013] [0.015, 0.016] [0.000, 0.000]
Ribena 500 -2.64 0.026 0.014 0.024 0.017 -0.013
[-2.66, -2.59] [0.025, 0.026] [0.014, 0.014] [0.023, 0.025] [0.016, 0.017] [-0.014, -0.013]
Ribena Diet 500 -2.80 0.011 0.026 0.011 0.031 -0.010
[-2.82, -2.76] [0.011, 0.012] [0.025, 0.026] [0.011, 0.012] [0.030, 0.032] [-0.010, -0.010]
Sprite 330 -3.25 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.009 -0.001
[-3.30, -3.23] [0.012, 0.013] [0.007, 0.007] [0.008, 0.008] [0.009, 0.010] [-0.002, -0.001]
Sprite 500 -2.55 0.030 0.017 0.029 0.019 -0.016
[-2.57, -2.49] [0.029, 0.031] [0.017, 0.018] [0.028, 0.030] [0.018, 0.020] [-0.016, -0.015]
Irn Bru 330 -2.94 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.008 -0.001
[-2.99, -2.93] [0.009, 0.010] [0.004, 0.005] [0.007, 0.007] [0.008, 0.009] [-0.001, -0.001]
Irn Bru 500 -2.69 0.019 0.010 0.018 0.013 -0.010
[-2.73, -2.65] [0.019, 0.020] [0.010, 0.011] [0.017, 0.018] [0.013, 0.014] [-0.010, -0.010]
Irn Bru Diet 330 -3.24 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.024 0.000
[-3.28, -3.22] [0.004, 0.004] [0.012, 0.013] [0.003, 0.003] [0.023, 0.025] [0.000, 0.000]
Irn Bru Diet 500 -2.91 0.009 0.019 0.008 0.025 -0.007
[-2.94, -2.88] [0.008, 0.009] [0.019, 0.020] [0.008, 0.009] [0.025, 0.026] [-0.008, -0.007]
Notes: For each of the four products listed we compute the change in demand for that product, for alternative
sugary and diet options and for total demand resulting from a 1% price increase. Numbers are means across time.
95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets.
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Table B.1 cont.
Effect of 1% price increase on:
Own cross demand for: Total
product sugary diet sugary non-sugary drinks
demand soft drinks soft drinks alternatives alternatives demand
Other Diet -2.31 0.049 0.112 0.045 0.079 -0.034
[-2.29, -2.17] [0.047, 0.049] [0.108, 0.114] [0.043, 0.045] [0.077, 0.080] [-0.034, -0.033]
Fruit juice -2.26 0.128 0.080 0.168 0.123 -0.012
[-2.28, -2.22] [0.125, 0.130] [0.078, 0.081] [0.164, 0.171] [0.121, 0.125] [-0.012, -0.011]
Flavoured milk -2.66 0.035 0.018 0.035 0.029 -0.020
[-2.69, -2.63] [0.035, 0.036] [0.018, 0.019] [0.034, 0.036] [0.028, 0.030] [-0.020, -0.019]
Fruit water -2.72 0.017 0.010 0.020 0.017 -0.011
[-2.76, -2.69] [0.017, 0.018] [0.009, 0.010] [0.019, 0.020] [0.017, 0.018] [-0.011, -0.010]
Water -2.30 0.115 0.281 0.128 -0.141
[-2.33, -2.28] [0.114, 0.118] [0.277, 0.284] [0.127, 0.131] [., .] [-0.144, -0.141]
Notes: For each of the four products listed we compute the change in demand for that product, for alternative
sugary and diet options and for total demand resulting from a 1% price increase. Numbers are means across time.
95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets.
In Figures B.2 and B.3 we replicate Figures 3.2 and 3.3, splitting individuals out
based on gender and in Figures B.4 and B.5 we split individuals out based on the
socioeconomic status. The graphs show the patterns of how preferences vary with
age and total dietary sugar broadly hold conditional on gender and socioeconomic
status.
Figure B.2: Preferences variation with age and gender
(a) price preferences (b) drink preferences
(c) infinite sugar preferences (d) finite sugar preferences
Notes: Figures show how the mean of price preferences, the mean of drinks preferences, the share of consumers
with infinite sugar preferences and the mean of finite sugar preferences vary by age and gender.
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Figure B.3: Preferences variation with total dietary sugar and gender
(a) price preferences (b) drink preferences
(c) infinite sugar preferences (d) finite sugar preferences
Notes: Figures show how the mean of price preferences, the mean of drinks preferences, the share of consumers
with infinite sugar preferences and the mean of finite sugar preferences vary by deciles of the distribution of total
annual dietary sugar and gender.
Figure B.4: Preferences variation with age and socioeconomic status
(a) price preferences (b) drink preferences
(c) infinite sugar preferences (d) finite sugar preferences
Notes: Figures show how the mean of price preferences, the mean of drinks preferences, the share of consumers
with infinite sugar preferences and the mean of finite sugar preferences vary by age and socioeconomic status.
“High” refers to those from a household whose head works in managerial or professional roles, “Low” refers to
those from a household whose head works in manual work or relies on the state for their income.
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Figure B.5: Preferences variation with total dietary sugar and socioeconomic status
(a) price preferences (b) drink preferences
(c) infinite sugar preferences (d) finite sugar preferences
Notes: Figures show how the mean of price preferences, the mean of drinks preferences, the share of consumers
with infinite sugar preferences and the mean of finite sugar preferences vary by deciles of the total dietary sugar
and socioeconomic status. “High” refers to those from a household whose head works in managerial or professional
roles, “Low” refers to those from a household whose head works in manual work or relies on the state for their
income.
B.1 Incidental parameters problem
Figures B.6, B.7 and B.8 show, for the price, drinks and sugar preference param-
eters, how the jackknife (θ̃split) and the maximum likelihood estimates (θ̂) relate
to a) the number of choice occasions of individuals that are in the sample, b) age
and c) total dietary sugar. They show no systematic relationship in the mean of
(θ̃split− θ̂) with any of these variables, with the dispersion of (θ̃split− θ̂) falling in T .
Figures B.9 plot the distributions of price, drinks and sugar preference parameter
estimates for both the estimators θ̂ and θ̃split, showing there is little difference in
the distributions.
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Figure B.6: Relationship between bias and time in sample
(a) Price (b) Drinks
(c) Sugar
Notes: Marks represent consumer level differences. Lines are local polynomial regressions.
Figure B.7: Relationship between bias and age
(a) Price (b) Drinks
(c) Sugar
Notes: Marks represent consumer level differences. Lines are local polynomial regressions.
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Figure B.8: Relationship between bias and dietary sugar
(a) Price (b) Drinks
(c) Sugar
Notes: Marks represent consumer level differences. Lines are local polynomial regressions.
Figure B.9: Preference parameter distribution
(a) Price (b) Drinks
(c) Sugar
Notes: Lines are kernel density estimates.
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C Demand estimates in at-home segment
C.1 At-home data
We use information on the at-home behavior of 4,205 households over June 2009-
December 2014. Of these 3,059 households are drinks purchasers.45 In Tables
C.1, C.2 and C.3 shows the panel dimension of the data, the products we model
choice over in the at-home segment and retailer types. This mirrors tables in Sec-
tion 2.1 of the paper for the on-the-go segment. In the at-home demand model a
choice occasion is defined as a week in which the household buys groceries and the
outside option corresponds to not buying any non-alcoholic drinks (exclusive for
non-flavored milk). In the estimation sample there are 653,063 choice occasions in
total. Households choose the outside option on 59% of choice occasions.
Table C.1: Time series dimension of at-home estimation sample










Notes: The table shows the number of choice occasions on which we observe household making at-home purchase
choices based on the 3,059 households in the at-home estimation sample. A choice occasion is a week in which the
household visits the grocery store.
45Defined as buying at 15 non-alcoholic drinks over the 5 and a half year period of our data.
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Table C.2: Products in at-home sample




Coca Cola Diet 330 0.15 0.57
Coca Cola 330 0.21 0.57
Coca Cola 500 0.74 1.01
Coca Cola Diet 500 1.18 1.01
Coca Cola multi can 2.50 3.43
Coca Cola Diet multi can 4.05 3.37
Coca Cola bottle 3.37 1.40
Coca Cola Diet bottle 4.27 1.37
Coca Cola multi bottle 0.14 5.27
Coca Cola Diet multi bottle 0.09 5.73
Dr Pepper 1.60
Dr Pepper 330 0.02 0.55
Dr Pepper 500 0.23 1.00
Dr Pepper multi can 0.27 2.46
Dr Pepper Diet multi can 0.11 2.41
Dr Pepper bottle 0.72 1.36
Dr Pepper Diet bottle 0.26 1.31
Fanta 1.78
Fanta 500 0.24 1.01
Fanta multi can 0.23 2.33
Fanta Diet multi can 0.25 2.53
Fanta bottle 0.82 1.33
Fanta Diet bottle 0.24 1.32
Cherry Coke 0.86
Cherry Coke 330 0.02 0.52
Cherry Coke Diet 500 0.10 1.03
Cherry Coke 500 0.14 1.03
Cherry Coke multi can 0.13 2.90
Cherry Coke Diet multi can 0.12 2.84
Cherry Coke bottle 0.22 1.34
Cherry Coke Diet bottle 0.12 1.32
Oasis 0.38
Oasis 500 0.38 1.01
Sprite 0.93
Sprite 500 0.12 1.00
Sprite multi can 0.11 2.37
Sprite Diet multi can 0.16 2.38
Sprite bottle 0.35 1.33
Sprite Diet bottle 0.20 1.34
Pepsico 12.71
Pepsi Diet 330 0.16 0.40
Pepsi 330 0.07 0.40
Pepsi 500 0.25 0.81
Pepsi Diet 500 0.71 0.81
Pepsi multi can 1.04 2.14
Pepsi Diet multi can 3.06 2.17
Pepsi bottle 2.00 1.09
Pepsi Diet bottle 5.43 1.10
GSK 3.62
Lucozade Energy 3.04
Lucozade Energy 380 0.21 0.76
Lucozade Energy 500 0.32 1.03
Lucozade Energy bottle 1.41 1.14
Lucozade Energy multi bottle 1.11 3.05
Ribena 0.58
Ribena 288 0.03 0.55
Ribena 500 0.08 1.05
Ribena multi 0.47 1.98
1.09
Irn Bru 500 0.04 0.94
Irn Bru Diet 500 0.04 0.94
Irn Bru multi can 0.08 2.53
Irn Bru Diet multi can 0.10 2.44
Irn Bru bottle 0.44 1.19
Irn Bru Diet bottle 0.39 1.19
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Table C.2 cont.
Firm Brand Product % price
Composite soft drinks
Other 2.23 1.23
Other bg 2.71 1.05
Other Diet bg 1.11 1.03
Other multi 1.02 2.08
Other Diet multi 0.35 1.87
Alternative drinks
Fruit juice 3.13 1.62
Fruit juice 18.38 1.40
Flavoured milk 3.32 0.79
Flavoured milk 1.30 1.05
Fruit water 0.04 0.76
Fruit water 0.67 0.91
Water 0.71 0.48
Water 10.89 0.89
Notes: Market shares are based on transactions made by the 3,059 households in the at-home estimation sample
between June 2009 and December 2014. Prices are the means across all choice occasions.
Table C.3: Retailer types in at-home sample
N %
Retailer types







Notes: The table shows the number and share of purchases made by 3,059 households in the at-home estimation
sample in each retailer type between June 2009 and December 2014.
C.2 At-home demand estimates
In Table C.4 we summarize estimates of the household specific preference parameters
governing at-home demand. In Figure C.1 we report estimates of the demographic
specific preference parameters.
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Table C.4: Demand model estimates – at-home
Moments of distribution of consumer specific preferences
Estimate Standard
Variable error
Price (αi) Mean -2.2780 0.0146
Standard deviation 1.6388 0.0189
Skewness -2.2208 0.1187
Kurtosis 11.0800 1.2050
Drinks (γi) Mean -4.4080 0.0655
Standard deviation 2.1179 0.0167
Skewness 0.1964 0.0362
Kurtosis 3.7723 0.1246
Sugar (βi) Mean -0.2777 0.0092
Standard deviation 1.5127 0.0116
Skewness 0.0154 0.0404
Kurtosis 3.2652 0.0987
Price-Drinks Covariance -2.2546 0.0430
Price-Sugar Covariance 0.0166 0.0198




) No kids, high educ. 0.4017 0.0033
No kids, low educ. 0.3899 0.0043
Pensioners 0.3884 0.0051
Kids, high educ. 0.6245 0.0051
Kids, high educ. 0.6482 0.0061
Bottle No kids, high educ. 0.9360 0.0917
No kids, low educ. 0.6614 0.1163
Pensioners -0.6708 0.1908
Kids, high educ. 0.2157 0.0873
Kids, high educ. 1.0181 0.1022
Multi-pack No kids, high educ. 1.5449 0.0687
No kids, low educ. 1.8543 0.0868
Pensioners 0.7329 0.1427
Kids, high educ. 0.6404 0.0679
Kids, high educ. 1.4604 0.0767
Advertising (δa
d(i)
) No kids, high educ. 0.0033 0.0011
No kids, low educ. -0.0001 0.0015
Pensioners 0.0045 0.0021
Kids, high educ. 0.0062 0.0011
Kids, high educ. 0.0041 0.0013
Temperature*Drinks (δh
d(i)
) No kids, high educ. 0.0101 0.0022
No kids, low educ. 0.0138 0.0029
Pensioners 0.0136 0.0036
Kids, high educ. 0.0098 0.0022
Kids, high educ. 0.0136 0.0027
Demographic specific carton-size effects (δz
d(i)
) Yes
Time-demographic-brand effects (ξd(i)b(j)t) Yes
Retailer-demographic-brand effects (ζd(i)b(j)r) Yes
Notes: We estimate demand on a sample of 3,059 households who we observe on 653,063 at-home choice occasions.
Estimates of the consumer specific preferences are summarized in the table. Moments of distribution are computed
using estimates of consumer specific preference parameters. These moments are based on consumers with finite
parameters and omit the top and bottom percentile of each distribution. Standard errors for moments are computed
using the delta method.
Figure C.1 shows variation in preferences for sugar and price in the at-home
segment and how they vary by deciles of the total dietary sugar and total equivalized
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grocery expenditure distributions. As expected, households that have higher added
sugar in their total annual grocery basket also have stronger preferences for sugar
when choosing what drinks to purchase, and households in lower deciles of the
equivalized total grocery expenditure (income) are more price sensitive.
Figure C.1: Preferences variation – at-home
(a) sugar preferences by total dietary sugar (b) price preferences by total dietary sugar
(c) sugar by total equivalized expenditure (d) price by total equivalized expenditure
Notes: Figure shows how, the mean of finite sugar preferences and the mean of price preferences in the at-home
segment vary by deciles of the distribution of total annual dietary sugar and by deciles of the distribution of total
annual equivalized grocery expenditure. 95% confidence intervals are shown by bars.
D Compensating variation
We use our demand estimates to compute compensating variation – the monetary
amount an individual would require to be paid to be indifferent to the imposition
of the tax based on their estimated preferences. Letting pjrt and p
′
jrt denote the
retailer type r time t price of product j prior to and following the introduction of
the tax, the expected compensating variation for individual i on choice occasion τ
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exp(vikr(τ)t(τ) + ηikr(τ)t(τ)) + 10̄∈Ωi exp(βi)

where vijr(τ)t(τ) and ηijr(τ)t(τ) are defined in Section 3.1.
46 Summing cviτ over an
individual’s choice occasions in the year gives their annual compensating variation.
E Equilibrium tax pass-through
In Section 5.3 we show that our results on the targeting of a soda tax are similar
under the assumption of 100% pass-through and under estimates of equilibrium
tax pass-through. Here we provide further details of our model of equilibrium tax
pass-through.
We model tax pass-through by assuming that drinks manufacturers compete
by simultaneously setting prices in a Nash-Bertrand game. We consider a mature
market with a stable set of products, and we therefore abstract from entry and exit
of firms and products from the market. We use our demand estimates for the on-
the-go market, demand estimates for the at-home market (described in Appendix
C) and an equilibrium pricing condition to infer firms’ marginal costs (see Berry
(1994) or Nevo (2001)) in order to then simulate the effect of a tax on consumer
prices.
Let f = {1, . . . , F} index manufacturers and Ff denote the set of products
owned by firm f . We assume that prices are set by manufacturers and abstract from
modeling manufacturer-retailer relationships. Such an outcome can be achieved by
vertical contracting (Villas-boas (2007), Bonnet and Dubois (2010)).47 Bonnet and
Dubois (2010) show that in the French grocery market price equilibria correspond to
the case where manufacturers and retailers do use non-linear contracts in the form
of two part tariffs. Testing for the form of vertical contracting in UK manufacturer-
retailer relations is an interesting question that we leave for future research.
We index markets by m. Markets vary over time and across retailer type. In
particular a market is defined as a year-retailer pair. We denote the size of the
46Note, that vijr(τ)t(τ) is defined such that it includes the effect of price prior to the introduction
of the tax.
47Non-linear contracts with side transfers between manufacturers and retailers allow them to
reallocate profits and avoid the double marginalization problem.
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on-the-go segment in market m by M outm and the size of the at-home segment by
M inm and we denote the set of individual-choice occasions in the on-the-go and at-
home segments of market m as Moutm and Minm . Aggregating across consumer level











Piτ (j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡qinjm(pm)
for each product j and where Piτ (j) follows equation (3.2).
If product j is available only in the at-home segment (e.g. if it is a large multi
portion product), then Piτ (j) = 0 for all (i, τ) ∈Moutm , and if it is only available in
the on-the-go segment then Piτ (j) = 0 for all (i, τ) ∈ Minm . However, for products
available in both on-the-go and at-home segments the market demand curve depends
on purchase probabilities (and hence preferences) in both segment.




(pjm − cjm)qjm(pm) (E.1)







= 0 ∀j ∈ Ff . (E.2)
Under the assumption that observed market prices are an equilibrium outcome
of the Nash-Bertrand game played by firms, and given our estimates of the demand
function, we can invert the first order conditions to infer marginal costs cjm. The
introduction of a tax creates a wedge between post-tax prices, p, and pre-tax prices,
which we denote p̃. The volumetric tax, π, on sugary soft drinks (denoted by the







where lj is the volume of product j.







= 0 ∀j ∈ Ff (E.3)
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for all firms f . We solve for the new equilibrium prices as the vector that satisfies
the set of first order conditions (equation (E.3)) when π = 0.25.48 Tax pass-through
describes how much of the tax is shifted through to post-tax prices, for products
j ∈ Ωws, we measure this as the difference in the post-tax and pre-tax equilibrium
consumer price over the amount of tax levied, πlj.
49
48We solve for a new equilibrium price for each of the products belonging to the main soft drinks
brands; we assume there is no change in the producer price (and therefore 100% pass-through)
of the composite other soft drinks brand (which aggregates together many very small soft drinks
brands). We also assume no pricing response for the set of outside products.
49We solve for separate price equilibrium in each of the 11 retailers and for a representative
month in each year, giving us 66 price equilibria.
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